ARTICLES
PARTICIPATION AND POLARIZATION
Richard H. Pildes*
ABSTRACT
Campaign-finance reformers have turned in recent years to a novel form of publicly-financed elections—smalldonor matching programs—as the way to reduce the perceived corruption that arises from the current role of money
in American elections. The rise of the Internet and social media have transformed the way campaigns are funded
and turned small donors into a major force in American campaigns. The 2018 elections dramatically
demonstrated the new power of small donors. Building on this transformation, the focus of reform efforts are now
programs that match small donations ($200 or less) with public funds, which typically provide $6 in public
funds for every $1 in small donations. Indeed, the first bill introduced in the new Democratically controlled House
proposes to create a 6:1 small-dollar matching program for national elections. In addition, the Democratic Party
required candidates for the 2020 presidential election to demonstrate a certain level of success with small donors
as one of only two factors that determined eligibility to be on the “main debate” stage for the first several debates.
Small-donor based public financing is touted as enhancing participation in democracy; improving the equality of
campaign financing; and providing a countervailing force against the role of large donors or special-interest money.
But little attention has been paid so far, particularly in the legal literature, to the effect of small donors on what
is one of the most troubling aspects of American democracy today: the intense polarization of the political parties.
In fact, an extensive empirical literature demonstrates that small donors tend to prefer candidates from the
ideological extremes of the major parties. Thus, while small-donor matching programs serve certain democratic
values, they might also contribute to making American democracy more polarized and more dysfunctional.
The issue of small-donor financing represents a larger point about the problematic direction of much political
reform over the last several decades. This “reform populism” seeks to address problems in democracy through
changes that encourage more direct, unmediated participation by citizens in the political process. But the more
engaged citizens are in politics, the more polarized they are. Paradoxically, participation fuels polarization.
Rather than jumping on the bandwagon of reforms celebrated in the name of enhanced participation, equality, and
anti-corruption, we should be careful to avoid designing political processes in ways that only further fuel the
hyperpolarization of American democracy.
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INTRODUCTION
Campaign-finance controversies and reform advocacy in recent decades
have focused primarily on the issues of “corruption” and “equality”: whether
large contributions or spending corrupt the decisions of public officials and
whether the fact that those with more resources are able to contribute or
spend much more than those without such resources is a troubling distortion
of the democratic process. But one of the greatest threats to American
democracy over recent decades has been the rise of hyperpolarized politics
and political parties; in the American separated-powers system,
hyperpolarized political parties make it all the more difficult for the national
political process to address the major issues of the day.1 When government
appears to be paralyzed, unresponsive, and dysfunctional, this in turn
furthers political alienation, distrust of government, and even contempt for
democracy itself.
In this light, it is thus surprising how little attention scholars,
commentators, and reform advocates have paid to exploring whether the
structure of American campaign-finance law contributes to the
hyperpolarization of the political parties and our politics that characterize
this era. With reform advocates fixated on the issues of corruption and
equality, this Article argues that we also need to assess the campaign-finance
system we have, along with potential reforms to it, in terms of whether
specific ways of structuring campaign finance tend to further fuel or diminish
polarization.2
To put these issues in a broad context: American elections (unlike those
in most democracies) are privately financed, which turns out to mean they
are mainly financed from the credit cards, checkbooks, and bank accounts of
individual donors. In the 2015–2016 presidential election cycle, 71% of the
money candidates raised for the primaries and general election came from

1
2

See Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America,
99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 277 (2011).
One of the only sources in the legal literature to do so is Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign
Finance Law, in DEMOCRACY BY THE PEOPLE: REFORMING CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN AMERICA 74
(Eugene D. Mazo & Timothy K. Kuhner eds., 2018). Stephanopoulos begins by recognizing that
individual donors come from the ideological poles of the party. But when he briefly discusses
public-financing options at the end, he does not address whether national small-donor matching
programs will reflect this same dynamic or even further fuel it, and he does not engage the empirical
literature suggesting that small donors are just as much or even more prone to reflect the ideological
poles of the parties and the electorate.
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individual donors.3 For House and Senate candidates in that same cycle,
about 59% of money raised came from individual donors.4 One of the most
robust findings in the empirical campaign-finance literature is that individual
donors are the most ideological and polarizing sources of money flowing to
campaigns (other contributors include political parties, political-action
committees (PACs), and candidates themselves). That finding is consistent
with the more general finding that the more individuals choose to be actively
engaged in politics, through various forms of political activity, the more
polarized they are.5 Those who participate most actively, that is, tend to
come further from the poles of each party than ordinary citizens or voters.
Donating money is a much higher level of engagement than merely voting.
This larger structure is important to bear in mind in considering different
directions for campaign-finance reform. In particular, recent years have
spawned a celebration of the rise of “small donors” in the money landscape.
As a result of the communications revolution, there has been a dramatic
increase in the number of people providing small donations6 to candidates,
as well as the total amount of money campaigns now raise from small donors.
Building on this transformation, the dominant thrust of reform advocacy has
turned to arguing that reforms should be organized around the role of small
donors. Whether through the adoption of voucher-systems of campaign
financing or through efforts to extend local government small-donor
3

4

5

6

FED. ELECTION COMM’N, PRESIDENTIAL PRE-NOMINATION CAMPAIGN RECEIPTS THROUGH
DECEMBER 31, 2016 (2017), https://transition.fec.gov/press/summaries/2016/tables/presid
ential/PresCand1_2016_24m.pdf. The total all candidates raised was a bit over $1.5 billion, with
$1.1 billion coming from individual donors.
FED. ELECTION COMM’N, HOUSE AND SENATE FINANCIAL ACTIVITY FROM JANUARY 1, 2015
THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 2016 (2017), https://transition.fec.gov/press/summaries/2016/tables
/congressional/ConCand1_2016_24m.pdf. This Article focuses on contributions to campaigns,
not on independent spending. Campaigns generally value direct contributions more highly than
independent spending on their behalf, partly because campaigns have complete control over how
to use resources in their own hands, and partly because campaigns benefit from the requirement
that broadcasters charge them the lowest available rate when they run campaign ads; independent
spending by non-campaign entities, such as Super PACs, must pay the full market rate instead.
See ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ, THE DISAPPEARING CENTER: ENGAGED CITIZENS, POLARIZATION,
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 61 (2010) (“The American public appears to be increasingly divided
into two groups: the politically engaged, who view politics in ideological terms, and the politically
disengaged, who do not.”).
In the federal system, donations under $200 do not require disclosure of identifying information
about the individual donor, and this Article generally defines small donors as those giving under
$200. See 11 C.F.R. § 104.3(a)(4)(i) (2019) (requiring reporting of contributions in excess of $200).
Where other definitions are used, based on the way the relevant literature or non-national
jurisdictions define small donors, those other figures will be provided.
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“matching” programs to larger jurisdictions, reform advocates have turned
much of their energy toward organizing election-financing reform around
the role of small donors. These are forms of public financing, but they
abandon more traditional forms of public financing for novel ones built on
the foundation of small donors.
But small donors remain individual donors. In recent years, extensive
empirical work has emerged that focuses on small donors. This work suggests
that, at the least, small donors are just as ideological and oriented toward the
political extremes of the spectrum as other individual donors. Moreover,
some of this literature suggests that small donors might be more polarizing and
ideologically extreme than other donors. To be sure, technological
developments and the role of small-donor financing are changing so rapidly
right now that any assessment of the nature of small donors to national, state,
and local campaigns can only be tentative and provisional. The 2018
midterms saw an explosion in voter turnout as well as small donations, as
discussed below; once we can fully assess the pattern of small donations in
2018, and whether it differs from the past, only future elections will be able
to tell whether these patterns reflect the exceptional and historic nature of
the 2018 midterms or a “new normal” in the flow of small dollars.
Nonetheless, the aim of this article is to bring to light questions about
both individual donors in general and small donors in particular that have
become timely. A cautionary note is needed about the unbridled enthusiasm
for abandoning traditional public financing options and embracing smalldonor campaign finance reform. Those who celebrate the benefits of small
donors for political participation, or for reducing the risks of corruption, need
to confront more seriously the question of whether such financing will further
contribute to political polarization.
We cannot, of course, undo technological changes that enable such
financing. But the current flush of enthusiasm for re-organizing the system
around small-donor financing risks crowding out other approaches to
reforming campaign financing. In particular, traditional forms of public
financing, such as used in a number of states7 and long in use in most
European democracies,8 continue to deserve attention; they provide many of
7

8

For a good recent summary of the states and localities that use various forms of public financing,
see generally Michael J. Malbin, Citizen Funding for Elections, CAMPAIGN FIN. INST. (2015),
http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/books-reports/CFI_CitizenFundingforElections.pdf.
See Oscar Sanchez Munoz, Political Finance and Political Equality: Lessons from Europe, in DEMOCRACY
BY THE PEOPLE: REFORMING CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN AMERICA 450 (Eugene D. Mazo & Timothy
K. Kuhner eds., 2018).
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the benefits of small-donor financing without contributing to political
polarization.
One last opening point, to frame what follows: the issue of small-donor
financing is of interest not just in its own right, but for what it represents more
broadly about the rise and celebration among reformers in recent decades of
more direct, less mediated forms of democratic participation. Such financing
is but one example of “the ascendancy of reform populism”9 since the 1970s,
which rests on the belief that the way to fix many problems with American
representative government is “by creating more opportunities for citizens to
observe, participate in, and control their government’s actions.”10 These
reform efforts romantically presume that most citizens will rush to take
advantage of the opportunities for greater political participation and
therefore fail to recognize that the subset of citizens who will in fact do so will
likely be as polarized as those who are already more actively engaged in
politics. I have written critically in recent years about the costs to American
democracy of this single-dimensional focus on increasing unmediated, direct
citizen participation.11 The issue of small-donor financing thus opens a
window into the more general issue of whether reforms pursued in the name
of enhanced direct participation will have the unintended consequence of
further polarizing American democracy.
I. THE RISE AND CELEBRATION OF SMALL-DONOR FINANCING
The communications and social-media revolution is transforming
democracies around the world, for better and worse. Initial days of
unqualified and naïve technological optimism have given way to more sober
anxieties about the ways unmediated direct political communication,
through social media and the Internet, can inflame and polarize political
debate, accelerate the spread of dangerously inaccurate rumors, or enable
anonymous political actors with various agendas to spread intentionally false
and misleading “information.” We now worry about whether democracy

9
10
11

BRUCE E. CAIN, DEMOCRACY MORE OR LESS: AMERICA’S POLITICAL REFORM QUANDARY 1
(2015) (title capitalization removed).
Id. at 7.
Stephen Gardbaum & Richard H. Pildes, Populism and Institutional Design: Methods of Selecting
Candidates for Chief Executive, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 647, 708 (2018).
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can survive the Internet,12 rather than celebrating how the communications
revolution will usher in a golden age of democratic engagement.
Among the aspects of democratic politics being transformed by the
communications revolution is the system of campaign fundraising. But here
the views have been always universally enthusiastic, or at least not critical,
about the way these changes might affect American democracy. Indeed,
many see this Internet-driven transformation of fundraising as heralding the
salvation of American democracy. By reducing the transactions costs of
communication and fundraising, the Internet has enabled the rise of the
“small donor” in the campaign finance system. Because First Amendment
constraints prohibit imposing ceilings on campaign spending, the rise of
small-donor contributions promises to generate a more egalitarian and
broadly participatory system of financing. In addition, small donors serve as
a countervailing force against what critics see as the corrupting force of
special interests or “big donors” in elections. Perhaps the emerging role of
small donors will also change the mix of candidates who choose to run and
are likely to succeed. Even those not troubled by the role that money
currently plays in American elections seem to have no reason to object to the
emergence of small donors as a more significant source of campaign
contributions.
With the emergence of small-donor contributions on a much larger scale
in recent elections, many reform efforts are now also designed to piggyback
on these developments or to reflect the same spirit behind the celebration of
small-donor financing. Currently, the most touted of these reforms is a smalldonor matching program, in which public funds are provided at a certain
ratio to match small-donor contributions up to a certain amount. So far,
these programs only exist in a few local governments—the most established
of which is New York City’s, which since 2009 has provided $6 of public
funds for every dollar of the first $175 in qualified contributions from city
residents (a successful ballot measure this fall will now raise that match to

12

See, e.g., Nathaniel Persily, Can Democracy Survive the Internet?, 28 J. DEMOCRACY 63 (2017); see also
Evan Osnos, Can Mark Zuckerberg Fix Facebook Before it Breaks Democracy?, NEW YORKER (Sept. 10,
2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/09/17/can-mark-zuckerberg-fix-facebookbefore-it-breaks-democracy.
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8:1).13 Yet with this limited experience to draw on,14 Democrats in Congress
are now focusing their campaign-finance approach around nationalizing this
program. Thus, the political reform bill introduced as the Democrats’
signature issue in the new Congress would provide for congressional and
presidential elections a 6:1 match for donations up to $200.15 The other
vehicle that is attracting a lot of attention is reform through voucher
programs, which some academics have touted for years, but was only
recently adopted for the first time anywhere (with a lot of national money
behind the effort) in Seattle.16
These reforms, grounded on a vision that small donors are an ideal source
of “good” campaign-finance money, have displaced efforts and enthusiasm
about the more traditional forms of public financing. These more traditional
forms, commonly known as “clean elections” or “clean money” programs,
entail full government funding. In these programs, candidates qualify for a
lump-sum grant, once they receive a threshold number of small contributions
(because these are low thresholds, they presumably do not raise the same
risks of fueling polarization as financing programs built entirely on small
donations, as is the case in matching-fund programs). These grants are
meant to finance the full costs of a credible campaign; candidates agree to
accept a spending limit in return for a grant that is equal to that limit. States
that use such programs for some of their state or local elections include
Arizona, Connecticut, Maine, New Mexico, and Vermont.17 Thus, there is
considerably more experience, particularly at the statewide level, with more
traditional public financing.
Nonetheless, as evidenced by the direction national Democrats have
taken campaign-finance policy in Congress, the reform energy is now nearly
all directed toward reform built on a foundation of small donors. Yet for all
13

14
15

16

17

See generally How it Works, N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., http://www.nyccfb.info/program/how-itworks (last visited Jan. 10, 2020); What’s New in the Campaign Finance Program, N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN.
BD., http://www.nyccfb.info/program/what-s-new-in-the-campaign-finance-program-2/ (last
visited Jan. 10 2020) (explaining change from six-to-one to eight-to-one matching system).
See Michael J. Malbin, Citizen Funding for Elections, CAMPAIGN FIN. INST. (2015),
http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/books-reports/CFI_CitizenFundingforElections.pdf.
For the People Act of 2019, H.R. 1, 116th Cong. § 5111 (2019). For a critical analysis of this bill,
see Richard H. Pildes, Small Donor Based Campaign-Finance Reform, 129 YALE L.J. ONLINE SYMPOSIUM
149 (2019).
Democracy Voucher Program, CITY OF SEATTLE, https://www.seattle.gov/democracyvoucher/aboutthe-program (last visited Jan. 10, 2020).
See Michael J. Malbin, Citizen Funding for Elections, CAMPAIGN FIN. INST. 6 (2015),
http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/books-reports/CFI_CitizenFundingforElections.pdf.

February 2020]

PARTICIPATION AND POLARIZATION

349

the benefits such programs might have along some democratic dimensions,
strong reasons for concern exist that such programs would add further fuel
to the fire of hyperpolarization that has scorched American politics in recent
decades.
A. Small Donors as the Salvation of American Democracy
In the world of election law and American democracy, it is hard to
identify many political “reforms” as unequivocally and broadly celebrated as
the emergence of the possibilities for small-donor-financed elections.
Although Democrats at the moment are feasting more heartily at the smalldonor banquet than Republicans, this has not led Republicans to criticize
small-donor financing but to try to figure out how to catch up.18 Indeed,
enthusiasm for small-donor financing goes well beyond the belief that it
would improve campaign finance to the view that it can revolutionize
American politics and, as a result, save our deeply-troubled political process.
Small-donor money, for example, has been proclaimed a way to
“reclaim” our republic19 and a “21st Century Solution” for fixing a broken
campaign finance system.20 Mark Schmitt, a long-standing advocate for
small-donor financing and not one normally to get carried away in unbridled
bursts of reformist enthusiasm, has frequently extolled the “revolutionary
potential of [a] small-donor democracy.”21 Reform organizations tout smalldonor financing as potentially having “profound” and “transformative
power” for American democracy.22

18

19

20

21

22

Stephanie Saul & Rachel Shorey, Republicans Seek to Boost Small Donations, But a Fragmented System
Stymies Them, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2019), http://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/04/us/politics/
republican-campaign-donations.html.
Lawrence Lessig, We the People and the Republic We Must Reclaim, TED (Feb. 2013),
https://www.ted.com/talks/lawrence_lessig_we_the_people_and_the_republic_we_must_reclai
m?language=en.
See ADAM SKAGGS & FRED WERTHEIMER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., EMPOWERING SMALL
DONORS IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS 13 (2012), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/
files/2019-08/Report_Empowering_Small_Donors_Federal_Elections.pdf [hereinafter Brennan
Center Report].
Mark Schmitt, Can Money Be a Force for Good?, AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 12, 2008),
http://prospect.org/article/can-money-be-force-good; see also MARK SCHMITT, BRENNAN CTR.
FOR JUST., POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM 9
(2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/A_New_Framework_for
_Democratic_Reform.pdf.
See, e.g., Brennan Center Report, supra note 20, at 2 (“[T]he transformative power of a small donor
matching program would be profound . . . .”).
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Nor is this advocacy confined to academic circles or the usual politicalreform organizations. Establishment as well as insurgent political candidates
at the highest level have heralded the promise of small donors, with messages
that small donor money can “restore balance to our political system.”23 In
the 2016 Democratic primary, both Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders
campaigned on a platform that would amplify the voice and influence of
small donors.24 And most of the usual reform organizations, including the
Brennan Center,25 Demos,26 Public Citizen,27 the League of Women
Voters,28 the U.S. Public Interest Research Group,29 the Brookings
Institution,30 and the Campaign Finance Institute31 have strongly endorsed
the mission of placing small donors at the heart of the campaign-finance
system.

23

24

25
26

27

28

29

30

31

Ian Vandewalker & Lawrence Norden, Small Donors Still Aren’t as Important as Wealthy Ones,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/10/campaignfinance-fundraising-citizens-united/504425/.
Hillary Clinton’s Proposals to Restore Integrity to American Elections, HILLARY FOR AMERICA (Sept. 8,
2015), https://www.hillaryclinton.com/briefing/factsheets/2015/09/08/restore-integrity-to-elec
tions/ [https://perma.cc/DR2J-DZ74] [hereinafter Clinton Proposal]; Get Big Money out of Politics
and Restore Democracy, BERNIE 2020 (last visited Jan. 10, 2019), https://bernie
sanders.com/issues/free-and-fair-elections/.
See, e.g., Brennan Center Report, supra note 20.
See, e.g., SEAN MCELWEE, BRIAN SCHAFFNER & JESSE RHODES, DEMOS, WHOSE VOICE, WHOSE
CHOICE: THE DISTORTING INFLUENCE OF THE POLITICAL DONOR CLASS IN OUR BIG-MONEY
ELECTIONS (2016), http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/Whose%20Voice
%20Whose%20Choice_2.pdf [hereinafter Demos Report].
See, e.g., Towards a Small Donor Democracy in the District of Columbia: Policy Components of a Small Donor
Campaign Finance System, PUBLIC CITIZEN, https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/migr
ation/dc_small_donor_matching_fact_sheet.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2020) [hereinafter Public
Citizen Proposal].
See, e.g., LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, League Urges U.S. Senators to Co-Sponsor We the People Act (Oct.
24, 2017), https://www.lwv.org/expanding-voter-access/league-urges-us-senators-cosponsor-wepeople-act.
THOMAS CMAR, U.S. PIRG EDUCATION FUND, TOWARD A SMALL DONOR DEMOCRACY: THE
PAST AND FUTURE OF INCENTIVES FOR SMALL POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS (Sept. 2004),
https://uspirg.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/Toward_A_Small_Donor_Democracy_USPIRG.pdf
[hereinafter PIRG Report].
ANTHONY J. CORRADO ET AL., BROOKINGS INST. ET AL., REFORM IN THE AGE OF NETWORKED
CAMPAIGNS: HOW TO FOSTER CITIZEN PARTICIPATION THROUGH SMALL DONORS AND
VOLUNTEERS (2010), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0114_campa
ign_finance_reform.pdf [hereinafter Brookings Report]. This Report was a joint report from the
Campaign Finance Institute, American Enterprise Institute, and the Brookings Institution.
Id.
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Enthusiasts for small-donors and their potential often portray small
donors as average, representative citizens. For example, matching-funds
programs based on small donors have been described as a way to “put
everyday Americans back at the center of our government.”32 Small-donor
financing is said to “unleash the voices of ordinary citizens”33 and allow
“average Americans [to] play a more meaningful role in influencing” who
wins public office.34 Along the same lines, Hillary Clinton, during the 2016
campaign, asserted that a small-donor matching system would “increase the
role and influence of everyday Americans.”35 Indeed, the ability to build
“small-donor” armies is now being said to be crucial to establishing
credibility in the presidential primaries for the 2020 election; small-donors
will be, it is argued, the “new straw poll” for these primaries.36 To the extent
there is an “invisible primary”37 before the actual primaries, that primary
might soon be conducted among small donors.
Among the other benefits touted on behalf of small-donor financing,
reformers often claim that small-donors are not seeking to influence policy
decisions; that their money is free of the taint of corruption that characterizes
many other sources of money; or that, to the extent small-donors do have a
distinct agenda, that is all to the good because it will offset the (corrupt) policy
agenda of large donors. For example, some civic organizations endorse
small-donor financing because it would “provid[e] candidates with the
opportunity to raise the money needed to compete for elective office without
having to depend on . . . donors seeking to influence policy decisions.”38
Other proponents press the claim that small donors’ preferences will “offset”

32

33
34
35
36

37

38

Nick Nyhart, Empowering Small Donors in Elections Will Strengthen Democracy, EVERY VOICE (Sept. 11
2015), https://everyvoice.org/featured/empowering-small-donors-elections-will-strengthen-demo
cracy.
Brennan Center Report, supra note 20, at 13.
PIRG Report, supra note 29, at 3.
See Clinton Proposal, supra note 24.
Elena Schneider, “The New Straw Poll:” 2020 Candidate Race to Build Small-Donor Armies, POLITICO
(Jan. 5, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/05/2020-elections-small-donorfundraising-democrats-actblue-1081892.
See MARTY COHEN ET AL., THE PARTY DECIDES: PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATIONS BEFORE AND
AFTER REFORM 10–16 (2008) (defining the “invisible primary” as the initial work candidates do to
“take polls, raise money, identify active supporters in the states with early primaries, and compete
for the services of respected consultants”).
ANTHONY CORRADO, COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., PROMOTING SMALL DONOR DEMOCRACY:
THE VALUE OF PUBLIC MATCHING PROGRAMS 13 (Mar. 2013), https://www.ced.org/pdf/
Promoting-Small-Donor-Democracy.pdf.
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or “[m]oderate the influence” of large donors.39 Still other advocates assert
that that “big donors diverge from the general public . . . on most key policy
issues,”40 and emphasize that small-donor money can work to counteract the
big-donor money that “skews our political system.”41 These views are
premised on the assumption that small donors are representative of average
Americans or perhaps the average American voter.
Reformers also suggest that small-donor-financed elections would create
better candidates and legislators. Small-donor money, we are told, will result
in “good legislators” rather than legislators with “well-heeled networks and
fundraising abilities . . . .”42 Others agree, predicting we would see a
“measurable change in the types of candidates” who run,43 implying that
these new candidates would hold policy views closer to those of average
citizens. Over time, we would see a “more effective legislature” as well as a
decrease in polarization.44 An increase in small-donor contributions, it is
said, would “improve candidate competition and voter choice, while
strengthening civic participation in the electoral process.”45
In all the advocacy and endorsement of small-donor financing, it is hard
to find any voices suggesting any potential downside to small-donor money,
let alone any resistance to a greater role for such financing. As one of the
most visible players in the reform community—the Brennan Center—
confidently concluded, “[t]here can be no doubt that small donors . . . play a
. . . positive role in our politics.”46 In the eyes of much of the reform
community, small-donor financing would not only “significantly enhance the
quality of democracy in the United States,”47 but it would also “restore
citizens to their rightful pre-eminent place in our democracy.”48

39

40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Mark Schmitt, Small Donor Empowerment: A New Menu of Options To Strengthen the Voice of Citizens, NEW
AM. (Apr. 29, 2015), https://www.newamerica.org/political-reform/policy-papers/small-donorempowerment/; see also PIRG Report, supra note 29, at 3 (noting the possibility of “encourage[ing]
a wave of small contributions that will help balance out the undue influence of large donors”).
Demos Report, supra note 26, at 46; see also PIRG Report, supra note 29, at 8 (“Wealthy donors have
political preferences and concerns that are distinct from those of other Americans . . . .”).
Demos Report, supra note 26, at 46.
Demos Report, supra note 26, at 48.
Schmitt, supra note 39.
Id.
Brookings Report, supra note 30, at 26.
Brennan Center Report, supra note 20, at 1 (emphasis added).
Brookings Report, supra note 30, at 53.
Brennan Center Report, supra note 20, at 23.
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B. The Rise of Small-Donor Financing
Before the 2018 midterm elections, small-donor financing had only
played a major role in presidential elections. Barack Obama was the first
presidential candidate to seize the advantages Internet fundraising presented,
particularly for raising money from small donors ($200 or less).49 His ability
to raise money from individual donors, large and small, was the main reason
he was the first major-party candidate to abandon public financing for his
2008 general election campaign.50 In the 2008 general election, he raised
$114.1 million from small donors, which constituted 34% of the contribution
dollars to his general election campaign.51 By taking advantage of the donor
list he built during that first run, by the 2011–2012 cycle he was able to
generate $218.8 million from small donors, which was 28% of his revenue
(Mitt Romney raised $57.5 million, or 12% of total contributions, from small
donors).52
In 2016, Donald Trump became the most successful candidate ever in
raising money from small donors, measured either in aggregate dollars or in
the percentage of his total contributions. In total small-donor dollars for the
2015–2016 cycle, Trump brought in $238.6 million.53 This figure is
particularly striking because, in the primaries, Trump self-financed half of
the contributions to his campaign.54 Moreover, small donations ($200 or less)
49

50

51

52
53
54

See, e.g., Abbey Levenshus, Online Relationship Management in a Presidential Campaign: A Case Study of the
Obama Campaign’s Management of Its Internet-Integrated Grassroots Effort, 22 J. PUB. REL. RES. 313, 317–
18 (2010); AARON SMITH, PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE INTERNET’S ROLE IN CAMPAIGN 2008
(2009), available at https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2009/04/15/the-internets-role-in-cam
paign-2008/ (characterizing the presidential campaign as “the first Internet election”).
See Adam Nagourney & Jeff Zeleny, Obama to Bypass Public Financing in the General Election, N.Y. TIMES
(June 19, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/19/world/americas/19iht-campaign.3.138
34230.html (reporting Barack Obama’s announcement to opt out of public financing and his
reasoning as addressed to donors: “[i]nstead of forcing us to rely on millions from Washington
lobbyists and special interest PACs, you've fueled this campaign with donations of $5, $10, $20
. . . .”)
The data in this paragraph, taken from a Campaign Finance Institute report, aggregate total
contributions by an individual over a two-year election cycle, including contributions to joint
fundraising committees that are attributable to the candidate. Thus, someone who gives $150 to
the primary for a candidate and $100 to that same candidate for the general election is not a small
donor for these purposes, given that the aggregate contribution is over $200. See Analysis of the Final
2016 Presidential Campaign Finance Reports, CAMPAIGN FIN. INST. (Feb. 27, 2017),
http://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/17-02-21/President_Trump_with_RNC_Help_Raised_
More_Small_Donor_Money_than_President_Obama_As_Much_As_Clinton_and_Sanders
_Combined.aspx (follow Table 4 hyperlink) [hereinafter CFI Report].
Id. at tbl.3.
Id. at tbl.2.
Id.
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made up 69% of the individual contributions to Trump’s campaign and 58%
of the Trump campaign’s total receipts.55 Trump did dramatically better
than Hillary Clinton ($138 million) among small donors; he raised about
$100 million more than she did, for the primary and general election
combined, which is all the more striking because of the role of self-financing
in his primary campaign.
Of the primary candidates who did not make it to the general election in
2016, the two who benefitted most from small donors were Ben Carson and
Bernie Sanders. More than half of Carson’s total contributions came from
small donors, and Sanders raised $99.7 million (about 44% of his total
contributions) from small donors.56 In contrast, four of the Republican
candidates raised the vast majority of their money from donors who
contributed the legal maximum of $2700 (Jeb Bush, Chris Christie, Bobby
Jindal, and Rick Perry).57 Sanders also pioneered a new technique for raising
small donations; much of Sanders’ small money came through intermediary
online platforms, such as the entity ActBlue, which enabled donors to go to
a single one-stop donation site and contribute to any candidate or
organization that has signed up with ActBlue (in contrast, small donors to the
Obama campaigns had to go to the campaign’s own website to donate).
Indeed, the single biggest night of political donations to ActBlue came the
night Sanders won the New Hampshire primary, when 20,000 contributions
arrived in ten minutes, after Sanders requested such donations during his
victory speech.58
But outside presidential campaigns, small donations had played a minor
role until 2018. In 2016, for example, small donors accounted for only about
6% of the money raised by House candidates. The 2018 midterms, however,
brought a quantum jump in small donations to House and Senate races.
Overall, Democratic Senate candidates raised 27% of their money from
small donors; Democratic House candidates raised 16%. ActBlue raised
more than $1.6 billion dollars for Democratic candidates and causes overall

55
56
57
58

Id. at 1.
Id. at 1.
Id. at tbl.2.
See Alex Roarty, How Online Money is Reshaping the Democratic Party, MCCLATCHY DC BUREAU (Aug.
23, 2018), https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/politics-government/election/article217164
250.html.
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in the 2018 election cycle.59 That was an 80% increase from what had been
raised through ActBlue four years earlier.60 Through September of 2018,
the average donation had been around $34.61 By the end of the 2018
campaign, it had become clear to Democratic candidates that “it’s how
campaigns are building from the first day, knowing that small donors are a
strategic part of their constituency, and that they have to build these smalldollar networks in order to be viable.”62 Indeed, the Democratic Party made
certain levels of success with small-donors one of the factors that determine
which of its candidates, during the presidential primaries, made the “main
debate” stage.63 If this level of small donations continues going forward—a
question discussed further below—it might amount to a revolution in the way
elections are financed for Congress.64
What kind of candidates benefitted most from this explosion in small
donations? The biggest winner on the House side from small donations was
far and away, as might be expected, Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, who
raised about 62% of her money from small donors (under $200).65 Among
Republicans, the three candidates who raised the highest percentage of their
59
60
61
62
63

64

65

Lisa Lerer, ActBlue, the Democrats’ Not-So-Secret Weapon, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/16/us/politics/on-politics-actblue-democrats.html.
Id.
Roarty, supra note 58.
Id.
Julie Bykowicz, For Democrats in 2020, Small Donors are Gauge of Fundraising Success, WALL STREET J.
(Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/for-democrats-in-2020-small-donors-are-gauge-offundraising-success-11547726400.
Because Super PACs have become such visible players in the campaign finance system in recent
years, it is worth noting, perhaps surprisingly to some, that individual donors are also the biggest
contributors to Super PACs. These are often the same individuals who make large contributions
to other participants, such as candidates and parties, and might have reached their maximum
contribution caps or have other reasons for donating to Super PACs. In 2016, Super PACs
accounted for about 16% of total election spending. NATHANIEL PERSILY ET AL., BIPARTISAN
POL’Y CTR., CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN THE UNITED STATES: ASSESSING AN ERA OF
FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE 38 (2018), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/
BPC-Democracy-Campaign-Finance-in-the-United-States.pdf [hereinafter Persily Report]. About
62% of their money came from individuals; organizations supplied the remaining 38% (of the
organizations that contribute, unions play a significant role, but corporations “are not big
contributors to Super PACs from their treasury funds).” Id. at 40; see also Paul S. Herrnson, The
Impact of Organizational Characteristics on Super PAC Financing and Independent Expenditures
28 (June 2017) (unpublished manuscript presented at the Meeting of the Campaign Finance Task
Force, Bipartisan Policy Center), available at https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/
2019/05/The-Impact-of-Organizational-Characteristics-on-Super-PAC-Financing-and-Indepen
dent-Expenditures.pdf.
David Wright, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Led with Percentage of Small Dollar Donors in 2018, CNN (Dec.
18, 2018, 11:21 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/18/politics/alexandria-ocasio-cortezsmall-dollar-donors-open-secrets/index.html.
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funding from small donors were Rep. Devin Nunes (who raised 49% of his
funds from small donors and who used his role as Chairman of the House
Intelligence Committee to defend President Trump against the Mueller
investigation); Rep. Steve Scalise (outgoing House majority whip); and Rep.
Mark Meadows (chair of the House Freedom Caucus).66 On the Senate side,
those whose war chests were most heavily funded by small donors were
Democrats Bernie Sanders (a remarkable 77%) and Elizabeth Warren (56%);
then the Republican Corey Stewart (50%), who lost his Senate race in
Virginia; and the also-losing Democrat, Beto O’Rourke (46%).67 In light of
this, it is no surprise that a 2020 presidential candidate who had realized how
successful she could be with small donors, Elizabeth Warren, then led a
charge for fellow candidates to renounce Super Pac support, eschew events
for large donors, and renounce self-financing. All this was designed, of
course, to make all the candidates strongly depend upon small donors.68
Moreover, small-donor contributions, like much else on the Internet, also
appear to be fueled by viral moments, by outrage, and by the culture of
celebrity. As a New York Times article regarding the presidential nominations
process put it, after analyzing six years of online donations, “the art of
inspiring online donors is very much about timing: It’s about having a
moment in the national spotlight—and then capitalizing on it.”69 One
example was Sen. Cory Booker’s “I am Spartacus” moment, which was
widely mocked but nonetheless produced the second-best day for small
donations to his campaign up to that point.70 Similarly in February 2017,
when Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell cut off Sen. Elizabeth
Warren from further speaking on the Senate floor, saying later that
“nevertheless, she persisted” in speaking after being warned to stop, the
moment immediately went viral. The next day, Sen. Warren received
27,000 online donations—two and a half times more than on any prior day
66
67

68

69
70

Id.
Karl Evers-Hillstrom, The Most (And Least) Popular Candidates Among Small Donors, OPENSECRETS
(Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2018/11/popular-candidates-4-small-don
ors/.
Julia Conley, Shunning Corporate Donors and Pledging People-Powered Campaign, Warren Shuttering
Fundraising PAC, COMMON DREAMS (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.commondreams.org/news/
2019/01/03/shunning-corporate-donors-and-pledging-people-powered-campaign-warren-shutte
ring.
Shane Goldmacher, 6 Days When 2020 Democratic Hopefuls Scored with Small Donors, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/09/us/politics/democrats-donations-2020.html.
Id.
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since 2013.71 When President Trump came to Nevada during the Senate
race and called the Democratic candidate, Rep. Jacky Rosen, “Wacky
Jacky,” that moment went viral and immediately boosted Rosen’s small
donations; the next day, she received one-third of all the small donations she
collected for that entire quarter of fundraising.72 Do we want to dramatically
amplify these moments by providing $6 in public funds for every $1 raised in
these ways? Similarly, the more obscure former tech. executive, Andrew
Yang, saw his individual contributions take off after he did a podcast with
Joe Rogan, a comedian and mixed-martial arts commentator; Yang
averaged 62 donations per day in the thirty days before the podcast, then
2150 in the thirty days after it.73
One of the effects of the rise of small donors is more widespread (if still
narrow) participation in contributing to campaigns. Despite all the
complaints about the role of money in elections, campaign financing in one
sense has never been more broadly participatory. Vastly more people now
donate money to campaigns, no doubt in part because the Internet has
reduced the transaction costs between campaigns and individual donors. For
example, according to self-reported figures from the American National
Election Survey, the percentage of people who report donating to an
individual running for office within the last year has doubled since 1992.
Back then, 6% of people reported having done so; in 2016, 12% so
reported.74 In 1982, only 65,970 people donated to presidential or
congressional candidate campaigns; in 2016, 3.2 million did so.75 Of this
remarkable 487% percent increase in fourteen election cycles, much of that
increase is concentrated in recent election cycles (nonetheless, this number
remains less than 2% of the adult population).
Reflecting the rise of small donors, the average size of donations from
individuals has gone down significantly over time. In 1980, the average total
71
72

73

74
75

Id.
See Julie Bykowicz, Democrats Outperforming Republicans in Small Donations, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 5,
2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/democrats-outperforming-republicans-in-small-donations-1
536139801.
Shane Goldmacher et al., The 5 Days that Defined the 2020 Primary, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/17/us/politics/2020-democratic-fundraising.ht
ml.
Adam Hughes, 5 Facts about U.S. Political Donations, PEW RES. CTR. (May 17, 2017),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/05/17/5-facts-about-u-s-political-donations/.
Zachary Albert, Campaign Finance Task Force, Trends in Campaign Financing, 1980–2016, at 17 (2017),
https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Trends-in-Campaign-Financing1980-2016.-Zachary-Albert..pdf [hereinafter Albert Report]; see also Persily Report, supra note 64,
at 22.
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individual donation was over $2000; by 2016, it had fallen to under $1000.
Starting in 2008, the number of individual small donors (defined here as under
$500) begins to exceed the number of donors who give in any other dollar
category (over $10,000; $1000–10,000; or $500–1000).76
But all this greater participation in terms of numbers of people must be
kept in context. Even as vastly more people participate through
contributions and the average donation has gone down, individual
contributions to campaigns have still become concentrated among a smaller
number of very large donors. Thus, in 1980, the top 25% of all donors
contributed about 58% of all funds.77 By 2010, that top quartile was
contributing 85% of all funds, and in 2016, the top 25% gave about 90% of
all funds (and just the top 5% of donors gave 61% of all funds).78 Put in other
terms, in 2000, half of all donations came from 73,926 individuals; in 2016,
only 15,810 individuals accounted for half of all donations.79
II. SMALL DONORS AND POLARIZATION
Individual donors are among the most ideologically extreme of the major
sources of contributions to American campaigns, as noted above. To
complete the picture and set the stage for the discussion of small donors and
political polarization, consider the other major sources of funding for
campaigns: the political parties, business groups, unions, and issue groups
(the latter three are all PACs). Not surprisingly, political-party financial
contributions flow heavily to centrist candidates; parties donate about twice
as much to candidates in the middle of the ideological spectrum as to their
candidates at the poles.80 Parties, of course, are incentivized to seek partisan
control and domination of legislative bodies, and as a result, they contribute
to their competitive candidates (challengers as well as incumbents) without
regard to political ideology. These incentives lead parties to contribute
significantly more to centrist candidates than extreme ones. Business PACs
tend to give more to moderates, with an edge to conservative moderates, but
76
77
78
79
80

Albert Report, supra note 75, at 17.
Id. at 17–19.
Id. at 18–19.
Persily Report, supra note 64, at 22.
RAYMOND J. LA RAJA & BRIAN F. SCHAFFNER, CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND POLITICAL
POLARIZATION: WHEN PURISTS PREVAIL 71 (2015).
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not extreme conservatives. Issue groups show a bimodal distribution, with
more money to the extremes on the conservative side than the liberal side,
but they provide a proportionately small amount of campaign funds.81 And
unions tend to donate to those on the extreme liberal end of the ideological
spectrum.82
These differences reflect the different motivations for giving these actors
have. Business groups primarily appear to give for access-oriented reasons;
they give only 5% of their money to challengers and 77% to incumbents,
with the rest going to candidates in uncontested races. Unions also primarily
donate to incumbents. The group that distributes its contributions most
evenly between incumbents (35%) and challengers (30%) is, not surprisingly,
political parties.83
With respect to individual donors, we can explore the relationship to
ideological polarization in three different but overlapping contexts. For each
category, this Article first summarizes the research on individual donors in
general and then turns in particular to what we know about small donors. It
is important to note that much of the empirical data we have to date is about
individual donors in general. Only a few studies have thus far attempted to
do detailed work that isolates small donors from other individual donors;
finding and analyzing data on small donors is difficult and costly to do. Thus,
many of the claims in this Article are about how individual donors in general
compare to other sources of campaign contributions, such as from PACs or
other organizational actors. But to the extent we can disaggregate
information about small donors from individual donors in general, nothing
suggests that small donors are less polarizing sources of money than large
individual donors.84
Section A briefly describes the “pre-history” of today’s more
technologically sophisticated small-donor financing: the use of direct mail
campaigns to raise money from small donors. In the era in which direct mail
81
82

83
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Id.
Id.; see, e.g., Michael Barber, Donation Motivations: Testing Theories of Access and Ideology, 69 POL. RES.
Q. 148 (2016) (identifying the contribution motivation of political action committees based on
empirical survey data); Adam Bonica, Ideology and Interests in the Political Marketplace, 57 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 294 (2013) (measuring the ideology of candidates and political action committees using
contribution-level data).
LA RAJA & SCHAFFNER, supra note 80,at 72.
In the academic literature, political scientists do not use the term “small donor” consistently. Some
use the terms “small donor” or “low-dollar donor” to describe donors who gave less than $100;
others use it to describe donors who give up to $500. This Article tries to adhere to the most
conventional definition of a small donor, which is someone whose total contributions come to $200
or less; when an article uses “small donor” to mean something else, that different use of the term
will be flagged.
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played a significant role, there is little doubt that the most successful directmail fundraisers from small donors came from the ideological extremes of
each party.
Section B then surveys the existing literature that directly assesses the
current policy preferences and ideology of individual donors and small
donors. The research shows that people who choose to donate to campaigns
are among the most ideologically extreme citizens: they are more extreme
than nondonors; more extreme than primary or general-election voters; and
more extreme than even those who can be defined as “active partisans” in
other ways. On this front, there is no consensus yet on whether small donors
in particular hold more ideological beliefs or policy positions than large
donors.
Section C next examines the relationship between individual donors and
the candidates to whom they give money. Regardless of the donor’s own
ideology or motivations, empirical studies thus far confirm that “extreme” or
ideological candidates receive more money from individuals than do
moderate candidates. Small donors have been singled out in some of these
studies, and they also contribute more to ideologically extreme candidates
than to moderate candidates. Historically, small donors have contributed
extensively to candidates or officeholders from the ends of the ideological
spectrum, such as Michele Bachmann or Alan West. Ideologically extreme
candidates or officeholders like these also receive more media coverage,
however, and thus it can be difficult to disentangle how much it is ideology
per se—as opposed to greater exposure—that accounts for this pattern.
From a policy perspective, that distinction might nonetheless not matter if
we are considering the merits of individual-donation-based financing with
alternatives like public financing.
Section D turns to exploring the existing literature on the motivations
that lead individual donors to donate. For all individual donors, the ideology
or issue positions of the candidates is consistently the most important factor
in the decision to donate. In addition, there is persuasive evidence that
donors do not make general donations to their party of choice, but instead
make sophisticated choices among candidates who best match their policy
preferences. In addition, individual donors are more likely to donate when
they hold strongly unfavorable views of the opposing candidate or party.
Finally, we know that the most ideologically extreme donors are the ones
most likely to be motivated by ideology itself when choosing to donate.
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Motivation for giving is the area where small donors and large donors
appear to diverge the most. Small donors are more likely than large donors
to say that a candidate’s ideology or views on social and moral issues
motivated them make a contribution.
A. Small Donors Before the Internet and Social Media
The modern era of campaign financing began in the 1970s, with the
Federal Election Campaign Finance Act of 1971 and later amendments in
1974. This legislation, for the first time, imposed contribution caps on
donations to campaigns (as well as spending limits, which were struck down
in Buckley v. Valeo85). Before this time, candidates typically were able to raise
large amounts from individual donors. But the potential for direct-mail
fundraising from small donors was first revealed, out of necessity, during
Barry Goldwater’s 1964 campaign. While more traditional GOP candidates
could rely on the GOP’s stable of big-money donors, Goldwater, an
ideological insurgent, could not (indeed, even after he won the nomination,
not a single Republican figure of national stature, other than Richard Nixon,
endorsed Goldwater86). Needing to find an alternative source of fundraising,
Goldwater turned to direct mail.87 The strategy was financially successful.
Goldwater received approximately 380,000 direct-mail contributions in
sums under $100—in total, Goldwater raised $5.8 million in total from
direct mail.88
Direct-mail fundraising entailed mass mailing of appeals to potential
donors along with a return envelope to make it easy for the recipient to
donate. Much like today’s collection of email lists, an adept direct-mail
strategy played the long game, accruing coveted donor lists and using data
from previous campaigns to more effectively target potential donors in later
campaigns.89 But unlike today’s Internet and social-media fundraising,
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424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) (per curiam).
RICK PERLSTEIN, NIXONLAND: THE RISE OF A PRESIDENT AND THE FRACTURING OF AMERICA
64 (2008).
Dan Nowicki, Direct Mail Another Legacy of ‘64 Goldwater Campaign, REPUBLIC (Apr. 12, 2014),
https://www.azcentral.com/story/azdc/2014/04/13/direct-mail-goldwater-legacy/7622041/.
HERBERT M. BAUS & WILLIAM B. ROSS, POLITICS BATTLE PLAN 73 (1968); Herbert E.
Alexander, Financing the Parties and Campaigns, in THE NATIONAL ELECTION OF 1964, at 179 (Milton
C. Cummings ed., 1966).
Shane D’Aprile, The Staggering Price of Money, POL. MAG., May 2010, at 30.

362

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 22:2

direct-mail fundraising was costly.90 As donor lists became more refined,
direct mail also became more cost efficient. While direct mail started off as
high minded and transparent, by the 1980s fundraisers had found that
extreme forms of messaging were the most effective.91
After Goldwater’s $5.8 million direct fundraising haul, other candidates
sought to cash in. Nixon raised $2.2 million in 1968 by direct mail and $9
million in 1972 (which was only 15% of his contributions).92 On the
Democratic side, George McGovern was the first and only Democratic
candidate to find success with direct-mail fundraising.93 With the help of a
then-young civil rights lawyer and emerging expert in direct mail, Morris
Dees,94 McGovern raised a remarkable 50% of his funds in 1972 through
direct mail ($15 million).95 George Wallace was also one of the most
successful direct-mail fundraisers of the era, particularly given how much his
campaign relied on small donors. In 1968, he raised 76% of his funds in the
primaries from small donors, who contributed less than $100 per person;96
in his longshot 1976 run for the Democratic nomination, he raised roughly
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A successful campaign in the 1970s cost 30% of the gross intake, though that number could vary
based off of the persuasiveness of the appeal, the skill of the donor targeting operation, and the
ethics of the operative who conducts the campaign. Haggerty, supra note 88, at 14.
Compare Laurence Jaeger, Can McGovern Be Sold Through the Mails?, N.Y. MAG., Sept. 18, 1972, at 46
(discussing McGovern’s direct fundraising appeals) with Gregg Easterbrook, Junk-Mail Politics, NEW
REPUBLIC, Apr. 25, 1988, at 17–21 (discussing in detail various kinds of less than ethical strategies
engaged in by both liberals and conservatives).
HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL REFORM
92 (1976); Haggerty, supra note 88, at 11 (discussing 1972 statistics); Christopher Lydon, Fund Raising
by Mail Works for McGovern, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 1971), http://www.nytimes.com/1971/07/
20/archives/fund-raising-by-mail-works-for-mcgovern.html (discussing 1968 statistics). The $9
million figure is given for the “Nixon campaign” direct mail gross. ALEXANDER, supra. Later in
the paragraph, Alexander states that direct mail drives “conducted by the RNC alone and
conducted jointly with the Committee to Re-Elect the President” raised $14.3 million after the
convention. The relationship between these two numbers is unclear. It is also unclear whether the
$14.3 million number also includes fundraising directed towards congressional candidates.
Surprisingly, Eugene McCarthy did not make much use of it, raising just $1 million of $11 million
total through direct mail. Lydon, supra note 92.
PERLSTEIN, supra note 86, at 639.
HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL REFORM
20, 90–91 (1976); see also Haggerty, supra note 88, at 11 (estimating a $10.5 million net from direct
mail). But see Brooks Jackson, Pulling in the Money: Hart’s Direct-Mail Drive Pays Off, WALL STREET J.,
Apr. 3, 1984, at 60 (estimating a net of $19 million from direct mail).
See Haggerty, supra note 88, at 11.
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$10.5 million from direct mail, which was 67% of his funds, despite a serious
physical disability from an assassination attempt.97
Direct-mail fundraising was, without doubt, most helpful to candidates
who were more ideologically extreme. Goldwater, McGovern, and Wallace
were the most extreme presidential candidates of the era. The shift towards
increasingly overwrought fundraising appeals over time shows how such
appeals turned out to be more effective. The king of direct-mail appeals was
the conservative Richard Viguerie. He explained that “[c]andidates who
have strong views, well thought out views on the right or the left, are going
to be able to attract more small donors than candidates who are less
controversial, if you would, who are less outspoken, who are in the mushy
middle, so to speak.”98 As he noted, direct mail allowed candidates to bypass
moderating institutions like the mainstream media when fundraising99
(Viguerie was so effective that McGovern tried to hire him for his 1968
Senate race, but Viguerie declined100).
Indeed, the success of this mode of fundraising has been offered as part
of the reason that Republican Party positions on social issues shifted
dramatically to the right in this era; Professor Reva Siegel attributes this shift
to the direct-mail fundraising campaigns by Viguerie and others.101 In a
similar vein, the journalist Robert Kuttner argues that concerns about
empowering ideological extremists caused DNC Chair Robert Strauss to
discard the McGovern fundraising list and generally avoid direct mail
fundraising after the McGovern campaign (though this is disputed).102
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191, 212–14 (2008) (discussing the direct mail strategy’s effectiveness in allowing Republicans to
“bypass the traditional media” in promoting the “restoration of the Constitution in matters
concerning criminal defendants’ rights, gun control, and other ‘social issues,’ including prayer,
busing, and abortion.”).
Robert Kuttner, Ass Backward, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 22, 1985, at 18. But see PHILIP A. KLINKNER,
THE LOSING PARTIES: OUT-PARTY NATIONAL COMMITTEES 1956–1993, at 126–28 (1994)
(contending that DNC leadership did make genuine but ill-fated attempts to use McGovern’s donor
list and pursue direct mail fundraising). Klinkner attributes the comparatively weak returns of the
Democratic fundraising during this period to a lack of ideological extremism.
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Similarly, in the 1976 election, Jimmy Carter brought on Morris Dees,
McGovern’s direct-mail guru, as national finance chairman, but despite
Dees’ expertise in direct mail, he decided other fundraising strategies had to
be employed for Carter, because Carter was too centrist a candidate for
direct mail to be effective.103
Thus, in the era of direct mail, small donors were more ideologically
extreme than even large donors. Experience with small-donor financing in
the age of direct mail raises questions about whether today’s technologically
transformed small-donor financing systems will be prone to the same
dynamics.
B. Policy Preferences and Ideology of Individual Donors Today
1. All Individual Donors
Political scientists have long known that individual donors are more
ideological than non-donors.104 This is what is known as the “U-Shape of
Political Activism.” As a recent Pew Research Center report put it, “those
who hold consistently liberal or conservative views, and who hold strongly
negative views of the other political party, are far more likely to participate
in the political process than the rest of the nation”—particularly with respect
to campaign donations.105 In a recent study of both large and small donors
to state-level elections, for example, La Raja & Schaffner confirmed that “all
[individual] donors are unrepresentative in their high degree of polarization
compared to nondonor adults.”106 As shown in the figure below, the
distribution of donors is bimodal, with most donors falling on either the very
liberal or very conservative side of the ideological spectrum. Nondonor
103
104

105

106

HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1976 ELECTION 722 (1979).
For some of the important work demonstrating this, some of which is discussed below, see, e.g., LA
RAJA & SCHAFFNER, supra note 80, at 37; Michael J. Barber, Ideological Donors, Contribution Limits, and
the Polarization of American Legislatures, 78 J. POL. 296 (2016); Michael J. Barber et al., Ideologically
Sophisticated Donors: Which Candidates Do Individual Contributors Finance?, 61 AM. J. POL. SCI. 271 (2017);
Andrew B. Hall, How the Public Funding of Elections Increases Candidate Polarization 20 (Aug.
13, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.andrewbenjaminhall.com/Hall_publicfund
ing.pdf.
PEW RES. CTR., POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC, SECTION 5: POLITICAL
ENGAGEMENT AND ACTIVISM, at 1–2 (2014), http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/section5-political-engagement-and-activism/.
LA RAJA & SCHAFFNER, supra note 80, at 47. More of La Raja & Schaffner’s work is included in
the section on small donors. See infra Part II.B.2.
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adults “are distributed more evenly across the issue scale.”107 The differences
are striking, though perhaps not entirely surprising:

Figure 1: Distributions of Issue Positions of Donors
Compared to Other Adults108

Similarly, another significant study of both small and large donors to
presidential candidates in 2008 and 2012 found that contributors were
“more strongly partisan and more ideological than non-donors.”109 In 2008,
for example, only 16% of donors described themselves as “Moderate/Middle
of the Road” or did not report an ideology, while approximately 45% of nondonors described themselves in this way.110
The most recent empirical work continues to generate even more
dramatic findings along similar lines. In the largest survey of campaign
donors thus far undertaken, the results showed “extremely large differences”
in ideology between donors and non-donor partisans of either party.111 The
extent of these differences vary based on party affiliation the specific policy

107
108
109

110

111

LA RAJA & SCHAFFNER, supra note 80, at 47. (demonstrating the high degree of polarization across
the political spectrum within the donor class as compared to non-donors).
Id.
DAVID B. MAGLEBY, JAY GOODLIFFE & JOSEPH OLSEN, WHO DONATES IN CAMPAIGNS? THE
IMPORTANCE OF MESSAGE, MESSENGER, MEDIUM, AND STRUCTURE 352 (2018) (discussing the
data compiled on contemporary campaign donors in general elections).
Id. at 191 & n.64 (“In 2008, 11% of donors describe themselves as moderate; 16% of donors in
2012. In 2008, 41% of voters (donor and non-donor) described themselves as moderate; 35% of
voters in 2012”).
David Broockman & Neil Malhotra, What Do Donors Want? Heterogeneity by Party and Policy
Domain 2 (Nov. 30, 2018) (Research Note), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=3288862.
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area involved. Thus, on economic issues Republican donors are much more
conservative than other Republicans; strikingly, this gap between Republicans
is as large as the gap on economic issues between non-donating Republicans
and Democrats.112 To make this concrete: on health care, 52% of
Republican donors but only 23% of other Republicans strongly disagree that
the government should make sure that all Americans have health
insurance.113 On social issues, Republican donors and other Republicans are
more closely aligned. On the Democratic side, donors are considerably more
liberal on social issues than other Democrats; on economic issues,
Democratic donors and non-donors are more in sync.114 And both
Republican and Democratic donors are more “pro-globalism” than other
supporters of either party.115 To the extent elected officials reflect the views
of donors more than other partisans, in part because campaign finance rests
so heavily on individual donors, these donations push Republican
representatives further to the right on economic issues and Democratic ones
to the left on social issues than the larger mass of voters prefer for either
party.116
Similarly, in a 2017 study of attitudes on specific policy issues, Hill &
Huber found that “contributors hold more extreme policy views than noncontributors” of the same party.117 This study included both small and large
donors, and tested for individual policy preferences across a wide range of
political issues, including “gun control, climate change, immigration,
abortion, jobs versus the environment, gay marriage, affirmative action, and
fiscal policy.”118 Hill & Huber found not only that contributors are more
extreme in their policy views, but also that contributors are more

112
113
114
115
116

117

118

Id. (noting the vast differences between partisan donors and nondonor party members, particularly
in the Republican party).
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 2.
The Broockman & Malhotra study briefly notes that these patterns are even larger among the
largest donors (those whose giving puts them in the top 1% of all donors) than among the rest of
donors. Id. at 7–8. There is no more refined comparison between small donors, such as those
giving under $250, and other donors, which makes it difficult to draw any conclusions from this
survey whether small donors are more or less extreme than larger donors.
Seth J. Hill & Gregory A. Huber, Representativeness and Motivations of the Contemporary Donorate: Results
from Merged Survey and Administrative Records, 39 POL. BEHAV. 3, 10 (2017) (title capitalization
removed).
Id. at 10.
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homogeneous in their views.119 These findings are reflected in the figure
below:

Figure 2: Ideological Positions of Partisans Who Donate Compared to
Partisans Who Do Not Donate120

On specific major policy issues, individual donors are also consistently
more liberal or conservative than non-donors.121 For example, “[o]n the
issue of abortion, Democratic donors are consistently more liberal than
Democratic non-donors. The percentage that would always permit abortion
is higher for donors than non-donors among Democrats . . . .”122 The same
holds true for Republicans; the percentage that would always permit
abortion is “always lower for donors than non-donors among
Republicans.”123 And in 2008 and 2012, Democratic donors were more
likely than Democratic non-donors to say they would “increase immigration”
or “support same-sex marriage.”124
In addition to comparing donors to non-donors, Hill & Huber compared
donors to general election and primary election voters, finding that
contributors held more ideological views than either set of voters.125 This is
a particular striking result, because primary voters are often thought of as
119
120

121
122
123
124
125

Id.
Id. at 13 (illustrating the ideological homogeneity of contributors based on an ideological scale
ranging from liberal to conservative, where Democrat and Republican donors alike share
ideological leanings more frequently than non-donors).
MAGLEBY ET AL., supra note 109, at 89–91.
Id. at 90.
Id.
Id.
Hill & Huber, supra note 117, at 14.
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among the most ideologically extreme, committed, and activists among a
party’s supporters. The authors of the study claim it to be the “first analysis
in the contemporary period to show that contributors hold more extreme
views than primary election voters.”126 The figure below shows the ideology
scores of donors, primary voters, general election voters, and other adults:

Figure 3: Ideological Positions of Donors, Primary Voters, General
Election Voters, and Everyone127

As the figure shows, this pattern holds true for both parties, although it is
more pronounced for Democrats than for Republicans.128 Specifically,
Democratic contributors were “substantially more liberal” than Democratic
primary voters, and the difference in liberal ideology between a Democratic
contributor and a Democratic primary voter was about as large as the
“liberal shift associated with being a college graduate rather than never
having finished high school.”129

126
127

128
129

Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 13 (illustrating ideology scores of donors, primary voters, general election voters, and other
adults based on a scale ranging from -1 to 1, indicating liberal to conservative ideology,
respectively).
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
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Professor Michael Barber is one of the leading researchers on ideology
and individual donors. His work reaches similar conclusions. In a study of
donors to state legislative candidates, Barber found that contributors were
more ideological than “active partisans,” which Barber defined as “voters who
identify with a political party and engage in political activities in addition to
simply voting.”130 Barber was able to identify this pattern among both
Republican and Democratic donors.131
The proportion of donors who have a strong political ideology (defined
as those who “self-identify as liberal/conservative, or extremely
liberal/conservative”) also appears to be rising, starting with the aftermath
of the 2000 election (and thus, partly in conjunction with the rise of
polarization more generally).132 Thus, a study of all donors (both small and
large donors and frequent and infrequent donors) from 1978–2008133 found
that there had been “substantial ideological stability in the donor population
over time until 2002 when the proportion of ideological donors sharply
increases.”134 Starting then, and continuing into the 2004 and 2008
elections, this work found “a unique surge in the proportion of ideological
donors.”135 Specifically, only 42% of donors were classified as “ideological”

130
131
132

133
134
135

Michael J. Barber, Ideological Donors, Contribution Limits, and the Polarization of American Legislatures, 78 J.
POL. 296, 306 (2015).
Id. (noting that among both Republicans and Democrats, “donors to state candidates are more
ideologically extreme than those who are equally politically active yet do not contribute money”).
Raymond J. La Raja & David L. Wiltse, Don’t Blame Donors for Ideological Polarization of Political Parties:
Ideological Change and Stability Among Political Contributors, 1972–2008, 40 AM. POL. RES. 501, 510
(2012) (discussing the recent increase in ideological polarization in the United States).
Id. at 501.
Id.
Id. at 504.
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in 1974, while 63% of donors were by 2008.136 The rise of ideologues in the
donor pool is shown in the figure below:

Figure 4: Increase Over Time in Percent of Ideological Donors 137

Finally, the most comprehensive study of both small and larger donors in
presidential elections, based on a unique data set, has recently been published
by David Magleby and his co-authors.138 For this work, the Obama,
McCain, and Romney campaigns provided the researchers with information
on small donors (under $200) that is not publicly available; the federalcampaign finance laws require public disclosure of information only for those
who contribute more than $200 in an election cycle.139 Although this data
set is unique, it is limited to presidential candidates. Given the much greater
name recognition and visibility of these candidates, it is important to keep in
mind the hazards of generalizing from contributions in presidential
campaigns to other races.
With that caveat noted, Magleby et al. found, consistent with other
studies, that individual donors are self-described extreme partisans:
We compared donors by treating the seven-point party identification
question as a seven-point quantitative scale, ranging from 1 being “strong
Democrat” to 7 being “strong Republican.” On this scale, McCain donors’
mean score was 6.0 and 2008 Obama donors’ was 1.8. In 2012, the mean
136
137
138
139

Id. at 510. The number of ideologues in the donor pool held fairly constant until 2000, where 41%
of donors were ideologues. That number surged in 2002 to 59% of the donor pool. Id. at 510–11.
Id. at 510.
See generally MAGLEBY ET AL., supra note 109.
See 11 C.F.R. § 104.3(a)(4)(i) (2019) (requiring reporting of contributions in excess of $200).
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score of Romney donors was 6.1 while the mean score of Obama donors was
1.7. In all cases, over half of a president candidate’s donors were in the most
extreme category. For example, 53 percent of Romney donors identified as
“strong Republicans.”140

In general, they conclude, individual “donors differ from voters in being
older, more affluent, better educated, more partisan, and more
ideological.”141 Thus, study after study confirms that individual donors, as a
group, are not representative of the general population and are more
ideologically extreme than voters in general—even more extreme than
primary election voters.142
2. Small Donors
While individual donors as a collective are highly ideological, there is no
clear scholarly consensus yet as to whether small donors are more ideologically
extreme than other individual donors. Anecdotal evidence, though, suggests
this possibility. As one scholar has put it, “[t]he most successful small-money
fund-raisers mix media exposure with partisan taunting and ideological
appeals.”143
In the 2012 House elections, for example, the three biggest fundraisers
were Speaker John Boehner ($22 million), who would be expected to top the
list, given his position at the apex of power. But he was quickly (and closely)
followed by two of the more extreme members of the House, Rep. Allen West
($19 million) and Rep. Michele Bachman ($15 million). For comparison, the
average victor in those House elections raised about $1.7 million and the
Majority Leader of the House, Eric Cantor, was far behind West and
Bachmann at $5 million. Moreover, these candidates from the ideological
poles are often much more dependent on small donations than other
candidates. Donors of less than $200 accounted for 64% of Bachmann’s
contributions, 48% of West’s contributions, but 5% of Cantor’s total
raised.144 In the 2010 elections, Bachmann herself raised more money from
140
141
142

143
144

MAGLEBY ET AL., supra note 109, at 55–56.
Id. at 64.
While many donors considered themselves to be strong partisans, less than 20% of donors were
willing to describe themselves as “extreme liberals/conservatives.” Seth J. Hill & Gregory A.
Huber, Representativeness and Motivations of the Contemporary Donorate: Results from Merged Survey and
Administrative Records, 39 POL. BEHAV. 3, 13 (2017).
Adam Bonica, Small Donors and Polarization, BOS. REV. (July 22, 2011), http://bostonreview.net/
bonica-small-donors-polarization.
Who’s Raised the Most, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/topraise.php?cycle
=2012&view=topraise&display=S&type=A2 (last visited Jan. 10, 2020). See also the underlying
data from OpenSecrets.org summarized in Ezra Klein, Big Money Corrupts Washington. Small Donors
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small donors than was collectively raised by all forty-eight “Blue Dog”
Democrats—moderates in the Democratic Party—running for re-election.145
The more systematic studies conclude that small donors are no less
ideologically extreme than large donors. That is, to the extent individual
donors are among the more polarizing sources of money in campaigns, small
donors might well contribute to this phenomenon, rather than counter it. A
study by noted political scientist Raymond J. La Raja, for example,
concluded that “small donors look almost indistinguishable from large
donors in their policy preferences.”146 La Raja examined a 2012 survey of
non-donors, small donors (those who gave less than $200 in an election
cycle), and large donors, which questioned respondents on issues such as
“abortion, wealth redistribution, taxes, and gun control.”147 The results
showed that donors were clearly more ideological than non-donors, but that
small donors and large donors were quite similar in their views:

Figure 5: Policy Preferences of Non-Donors vs. Small and Large Donors148

As La Raja stresses, “[s]mall donors are not, in the main, ordinary
Americans. They are sufficiently passionate about politics to part with their

145
146
147
148

Polarize It., WASH. POST (May 10, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/
2013/05/10/big-money-corrupts-washington-small-donors-polarize-it/.
Bonica, supra note 143.
Raymond J. La Raja, Campaign Finance and Partisan Polarization in the United States Congress, 9 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 223, 251 (2014).
Id. at 250–51.
Id. at 252.
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money, much like consumers who spend on products they like. And with
passion comes extremism, at least relative to the rest of the American
electorate.”149 La Raja & Schaffner continued this work in 2015 with the
book, Campaign Finance and Political Polarization: When Purists Prevail.150 In an
examination of small and large donors to state-level elections, La Raja &
Schaffner again concluded that “[s]mall donors are as ideological as large
donors.”151
One of the first large studies comparing the ideological views of small
donors and large donors was conducted in 2006 by the Institute for Politics,
Democracy & the Internet (IPDI) in collaboration with the Campaign
Finance Institute (CFI).152 Beyond ideology, the IPDI Report provides the
most comprehensive comparison of small and large donors across a number
of different dimensions, including age, gender, income, occupation, religious
faith, and education.153 However, there may be reasons to doubt how
representative the sample was of all small donors given its methodology. To
study small donors, the authors compiled a list of donors who contributed
less than $200 to a presidential candidate who had participated in the
matching funds program, as these funds are required to be reported to the
FEC, unlike most donations under $200.154 However, only six Democratic
candidates and one independent candidate, Ralph Nader, participated in the
matching funds program.155 While the authors were able to include some
small donors to Republican candidate George Bush (taken from his website),
the sample consists primarily of small Democratic donors.156 In addition, the
sample relies on only one presidential election cycle (2004). Finally, the

149
150
151

152

153
154
155
156

Id. at 251.
See generally LA RAJA & SCHAFFNER, supra note 80.
Id. at 114. In a 2011 study, La Raja & Wiltse noted “that major donors (giving excess of US$200)
appear somewhat more ideological than small donors,” though the difference was “slight” and was
not explored in this study. La Raja & Wiltse, supra note 132, at 519.
See generally INSTITUTE FOR POLITICS, DEMOCRACY & THE INTERNET, SMALL DONORS AND
ONLINE GIVING: A STUDY OF DONORS TO THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS (2006),
http://www.cfinst.org/president/pdf/IPDI_SmallDonors.pdf [hereinafter IPDI Report].
Id. at 12–15.
Id. at 7–8 (describing methodology for study of polarization among small donors).
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8 (noting that more information was available from the campaigns of Democratic candidates
and Ralph Nader because they applied for matching funds and incurred a reporting requirement).
John Kerry and Howard Dean did not participate in the matching funds program, so their donors
are not directly included in the study. However, the authors note that “39 percent of the small
donors we surveyed [who contributed to one of the candidates who participated in the matching
funds program] made a donation to Kerry.” Id. Therefore, Kerry donors are indirectly represented
in the study.
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Report defines small donors as those who donated a total of $100 or less, in
contrast to the typical $200 cutoff.157
With these caveats aside, the IPDI Report ultimately concluded that
“small donors are no more extreme in their opinions than large
donors . . . .”158 While not “extremists,”159 small donors did not necessarily
have the same opinions as large donors, and sometimes expressed more
conservative opinions than large donors:
Large and small donors differed on two social issues. Here we analyzed
Bush and Kerry donors separately to control for partisanship. Small donors
were more likely than large donors to agree that “government should enact
laws to restrict gay marriage” and “mandatory death penalty for murder
should be the law.” Small donors and large donors did not differ on the other
economic and social issues of whether “government should provide health
insurance for the uninsured” or whether “government should spend more
money to reduce poverty.” Bush donors and Kerry donors still are far apart
on these issues, but within each group, small donors are more socially
conservative than large donors on these issues.
Among donors to John Kerry, small donors differed from large donors on
the statement “taxes should be cut even if it means reducing public services.”
Small donors to Kerry, while still tending to disagree with that statement,
were nonetheless more conservative in their overall response. Here small
donors appear to be more economically conservative on this issue.160

The IPDI Report also found that “that small donors were generally more
conservative than large donors when we asked them to place themselves on
an ideological scale from ‘strong conservative’ to ‘strong liberal.’”161
However, the IPDI Report ultimately concluded that small donors are not
likely to be “polarizing,” in part because small donors to Bush and Kerry
“are no more likely . . . to be party ideologues and place themselves at the
end of the party spectrum.”162 The authors of the IPDI Report thus
appeared to be using polarization to describe partisan political affiliation and
not ideological beliefs.
After its participation in the IPDI Report, the Campaign Finance
Institute (“CFI”) continued its “Small Donor Project” and published its

157
158
159
160
161
162

Id. at 9. The IPDI Report considered large donors to be those who donated $500 or more. Id.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id. at 35, 43.

February 2020]

PARTICIPATION AND POLARIZATION

375

preliminary findings.163 The Project surveyed donors and non-donors to
state legislative and gubernatorial candidates in seven states: Arizona,
Colorado, Connecticut, Iowa, Ohio, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania.164 The
Project classified those who gave a total of $100 or less in a calendar year as
small donors, those who gave between $100–500 as medium donors, and
those who gave more than $500 as large donors.165 In 2008, Joe et al. used
the data from this Small Donor Project to study the ideological differences
between small and large donors. Joe et al. found that “small donors . . . are
not more ideologically charged than donors who give larger amounts”166 and
that “in some instances” the policy views of small donors are closer to those
of non-donors than to large donors, while in other areas, these views are
similar between large and small donors.167
For example, Joe et al. examined the policy preferences of small and large
donors on two controversial issues: abortion and same-sex marriage.168 The
results were mixed. For abortion, Joe et al. found that “[t]he views of nondonors are closer to those of small donors than to large donors. Even when
small donors take the strong pro-life position, their positions may be
‘extreme,’ but they remain, in the aggregate, more representative than are
those of the large donors.”169 The results on same-sex marriage were varied,
with small donors in some states holding views in between non-donors and
large donors.170 However, in Arizona, small donors “were more likely than
non-donors or large donors” to strongly disagree that their state government
should ban same-sex marriage.171 In other states, like Iowa, small donors
were more likely than non-donors or large donors to strongly agree that the
government should ban same-sex marriage.172
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See generally Wesley Y. Joe et al., Do Small Donors Improve Representation? Some Answers from Recent
Gubernatorial and State Legislative Elections, CAMPAIGN FIN. INST. (2008), http://www.cfinst.org/
pdf/books-reports/APSA_2008_SmallDonors.pdf.
Id. at 6 (describing sources of data for the study).
Id. at 7.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 10 (outlining the study’s approach to evaluating donors’ positions on “battlegrounds of the
culture wars” (quotations omitted)).
Id.
Id.
Id. (describing a divide among small and large donors in Arizona voting on a 2006 state referendum
on same sex marriage).
Id.
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Joe et al. also tested to see if small donors held “unrepresentatively strong
views about economic issues.”173 To do this, they “created a scale of
economic ideological orientation by taking the average response to four
questions about government intervention in the health insurance market, the
minimum wage, tax cuts, and a tradeoff between environmental protection
and jobs.”174 Joe et. al found that “small donors are slightly more
conservative than non-donors” but that small donors’ “mean score is usually
closer to that of the non-donors than to the large donors.”175
Nor did small donors have different priorities for short-term government
action on these issues. Joe et al. found that “[a]cross a broad range of
traditionally polarizing issues, the intensity of small donors’ preference for
near-term state action usually falls between that of the non-donors and large
donors.”176 Overall, Joe et al. concluded that they saw “few grounds for the
concern that a greater influx of small donors will increase pressure on
lawmakers to allocate more agenda space to issues that concern ideological
activist minorities more than others.”177
As some of the leading proponents of small-donor financing concluded a
few years ago, it remains the case that there is not yet enough research in this
area to reach firm conclusions about whether significant differences in policy
preferences and ideology exist between small and large donors.178
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id.
See Michael J. Malbin, Small Donors: Incentives, Economies of Scale, and Effects, 11 FORUM 385, 396
(2013) (“[T]here has not yet been enough research to support either claim one over the null
hypothesis that there is no systematic ideological difference between small and large donors. The
answer could even be different in different elections. For example, there is no evidence to support
the claim that Obama’s small donors were any different on the issues from his large donors. This
is consistent with the evidence cited in Raymond La Raja’s article for this symposium, which noted
the literature showing that active campaign donors of all amounts were relatively extreme
ideologically. In state elections the only survey of donors and non-donors done so far rejected the
small donor polarization hypothesis. On almost every issue in that set of surveys, small donors fell
not at the extremes in their policy positions, but between the non-donors and large donors (Joe et al.
2008). However, there was only one set of such surveys and the results therefore are not
dispositive.”)
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C. Relationship Between Candidates and Individual Donors
1. All Individual Donors
More individuals are contributing to campaigns than ever before.179 For
example, over three million individuals contributed in the 2016 election
cycle, up from approximately sixty-six thousand individuals in 1982.180 In
assessing the nature of individual contributions to congressional campaigns,
it is important to recognize how high a percentage of these donations are
now coming from outside the district at issue—indeed, from geographic
areas far distant from those districts. This is because out-of-district money
tends to be from more extreme partisans than in-district contributions.181 A
major study of out-of-district donations (above $200) notes that that in the
“late 1970s” about 48–53% of candidates’ funds came from out of district,
from 1996 to 2000 that percentage rose to 63%, and in 2002 and 2004 that
percentage rose again to, respectively, 68% and 67%.182 For Senate races in
2012, an average of 40% of individual donations came from out of state.183
A majority of individual contributions came from in-district residents in
fewer than 20% of congressional districts in 2004.184 And in nearly the same
percentage of districts, outside money constituted 90% or more of the
candidates’ individual contributions.185 Moreover, this money did not come
mostly from those who live in adjacent districts, but from geographically
distant areas concentrated in a relatively small number of districts, such as
wealthy areas of New York, Los Angeles, Florida, Chicago, Maryland, New
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Persily Report, supra note 64, at 22 (noting that “the number of donors contributing to candidate
campaigns has increased steadily over the last decade”).
Id. (describing the recent rise in campaign donor numbers).
See James G. Gimpel, Frances E. Lee & Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz, The Check is in the Mail:
Interdistrict Funding Flows in Congressional Elections, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 373, 374, 377–78 (2008) (noting
that highly partisan “donor class” is “clustered” in particular areas and spends substantial sums out
of district); Brittany H. Bramlett, James G. Gimpel & Frances E. Lee, The Political Ecology of Opinion
in Big-Donor Neighborhoods, 33 POL. BEHAV. 565, 572 (2011) (illustrating divergence in political
opinion between those who contribute the most and those who contribute the least to campaigns);
see also James G. Gimpel, Frances E. Lee & Joshua Kaminski, The Political Geography of Campaign
Contributions in American Politics, 68 J. POL. 626, 634–35 (2006) (illustrating donor characteristics).
Courts have generally struck down distinct campaign-finance limits imposed on out-of-jurisdiction
donors. For a recent example, in which the Ninth Circuit held unconstitutional under the First
Amendment Alaska’s attempt to limit candidates to accepting no more than $3000 per year from
non-Alaska residents, see Thompson v. Hebdon, 909 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2018) (2–1 decision).
James G. Gimpel et al., The Check Is in the Mail, supra note 181, at 378.
Michael J. Barber et al., supra note 104, at 271–72.
James G. Gimpel et al., The Check Is in the Mail, supra note 181, at 378.
The precise figure is 18%. Id.
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Jersey, Atlanta, and others.186 Thus, 5% of congressional districts in this
2004 analysis provided more than 25% of all non-local money, and just 20%
of congressional districts provided a majority of the outside money.187 And
“campaigns in districts represented by more ideologically extreme members
secured additional nonlocal funding from individual contributors, even after
accounting for the competitiveness of the contest.”188 Both cause and effect
of the nationalization of elections in a polarized era, the much greater
dependency of congressional campaigns on outside donors further
contributes to polarization and the success of more extremist candidates.
A number of studies to date suggest that “extreme” or ideological
candidates receive more money from individuals than moderate candidates
do. For example, although “extreme” and “moderate” candidates may raise
similar amounts of money in total, the source of those funds varies greatly.189
In a study of donations to candidates for the House of Representatives from
1984–2004, Johnson confirmed that “extreme candidates are more likely to
rely on individual contributors than are moderate candidates.”190 To put
this in concrete terms, across the ideological scale, “a shift in extremism from
the congressional median to the third quartile” would translate into $67,000
in additional funds raised from individuals.191 Johnson speculates that
extremism might not be a fundraising advantage overall, however, because
“any gains from being extreme are offset by losses among the ‘accessoriented’ contributors, for whom extremists are distasteful.”192
A 2009 study of individual contributions to House candidates found a
similar pattern.193 Specifically, “the more conservative a Republican
candidate is the more money he or she raises from individuals” and “the
more liberal the Democratic candidate is relative to other Democratic
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189
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Id.; see also Bramlett, supra note 181, at 565–66.
James G. Gimpel et al., supra note 181, at 382.
Id. at 386.
Bertram Johnson, Individual Contributions: A Fundraising Advantage for the Ideologically Extreme?, 38 AM.
POL. RES. 890, 894 (2010) (stating that while the number of “extreme contributors” is increasing,
extreme candidates are not actually raising more money).
Id. at 890.
Id. at 899.
Id. at 894.
Michael J. Ensley, Individual Campaign Contributions and Candidate Ideology, 138 PUB. CHOICE 221, 230
(2009) (investigating the relationship between individual donations and candidates’ ideological
positions).
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candidates, the more money the candidate collects from individuals.”194 In
actual fundraising numbers, while the average Republican in this study’s
sample raised $144,000 from individuals, “total contributions from
individuals for a candidate who is two standard deviations more conservative
than the average Republican candidate would increase to $258,000.”195
More recent data confirms these trends. La Raja & Schaffner found in
2015 that “[a]s incumbents vote in more ideologically extreme ways in the
legislature, they tend to receive a higher proportion of their campaign funds
from individuals . . . .”196 And Michael Barber’s important recent work
shows that “legislators who are more ideologically extreme . . . raise more of
their money from individual donors.” Consistent with the discussion above,
Barber also found that, “[o]n the other hand, moderate legislators . . . raise
significantly more money from PAC contributions than do extremists.”197
Barber presents these results in these two striking figures:

Figure 6: Ideology of Individual Donors Compared to PAC Contributors 198

In the same piece, Barber showed that changes to contribution limits
have significant effects on the ideology of legislators. The direction of these
changes is consistent with the general picture of how much more ideological

194

195
196
197
198

Id. at 227–30. As an interesting and somewhat related matter, in 2017, Thomsen & Swers showed
this effect is greater for women than for men. Generally, “male Democratic and Republican donors
are less likely to support strongly ideological candidates. A one-unit increase in conservatism leads
to a 32 percent increase in donations from male Democratic donors and a 40 percent decrease in
donations from male Republican donors.” Danielle M. Thomsen & Michele L. Swers, Which
Women Can Run? Gender, Partisanship, and Candidate Donor Networks, 70 POL. RES. Q. 449, 458 (2017).
Ensley, supra note 193, at 227.
LA RAJA & SCHAFFNER, supra note 80, at 84.
Barber, supra note 130, at 308.
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individual donors are than PAC donors. Specifically, Barber showed that
“raising contribution limits on individual donors polarizes legislators in
office, while increasing PAC limits leads to greater moderation.”199
Strikingly, Barber found that raising the individual contribution limit by
100% (for example, from $1,000 to $2,000) had such a significant effect on
legislator’s ideology that the effect “is equivalent in size to the ideological
change we expect to see from a 16-point shift in a district’s average
partisanship.”200 Thus, Barber concludes that state laws limiting individual
contributions encourage moderation in candidates, who then become more
dependent on PAC contributions, or, in the same vein, that state laws
permitting high levels of PAC contributions favor more moderate
candidates.201 Of course, one can be concerned that while PAC money
favors moderates, it also might be more likely to be a source of inappropriate
special-interest influence.
2. Small Donors
Small donors appear to contribute more to ideologically extreme
candidates than do other individual donors. But some studies suggest this
might be true only for extremists who are incumbents.
In perhaps the most sophisticated effort so far to test this question, Bonica
et al. compared “small donors” (defined as “donors giving $500 or less during
a two-year election cycle”) to individual donors who are members/directors
of Fortune 400/500 firms; individuals who are in the top .01% of Americans
by income; and the thirty richest Americans.202 Bonica’s study shows that
these smaller donors are primarily responsible for donations to ideological
candidates when compared to much larger donors.203 The results show, as
expected, that individual donors as a whole tend to give to more ideological
candidates.204 But “contributions from small donors go disproportionately
to candidates on the ideological extremes” compared to the other two
groups.205 In addition, the top thirty richest Americans (who donate) are the
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Id. at 297.
Id. at 303.
Id.
Adam Bonica et al., Why Hasn’t Democracy Slowed Rising Inequality?, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 103, 112–14
(2013).
Id. at 115.
Id.
Id. at 116.
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most moderate of all the groups.206 The results of the study are represented
below:

Figure 7: Ideological Distribution of Small Donors, Members/Directors of Fortune
400/500 Firms, Individuals in the Top .01% by Income, and the
Thirty Richest Americans207

These results are consistent with observations that small donors tend to
disproportionately fund extreme candidates like Michele Bachmann or Alan
Grayson. For example, Bonica has noted:
during the 2010 election cycle, small donors (those who contribute $200 or
less) gave $3.4 million to Grayson and a record-shattering $7.5 million to
Bachmann. Overall, ten percent of House candidates raised over fifty
percent of small-donor dollars. Moderates were less successful in attracting
small donors. In fact, Bachmann alone raised more from small donors than
the combined amount raised by all 48 Blue Dog Democrats running for
reelection.208
206
207
208

Id.
Id. at 115.
Adam Bonica, Small Donors and Polarization, BOS. REV. (July 22, 2011), http://bostonreview.net/bon
ica-small-donors-polarization. It should be noted that there is some debate in the literature on
whether donations can actually provide significant information about the donor’s ideology or policy
preferences. Hill & Huber, supra note 117, Bonica, infra, and Barber, supra note 104, are the primary
contributors to this debate. Hill & Huber tend to say no, believing that although donations are
good indicator of general ideology of the donor, they cannot distinguish the donor’s preferences
within parties very well. Hill & Huber, supra note 117, at 22–25. In sum, Hill & Huber conclude

382

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 22:2

Other recent work suggests that small donors contribute particularly
strongly to incumbents at the political poles of the spectrum. A recent study
of small donors to congressional candidates between 2006 and 2010 finds
that, controlling for relevant variables, “[t]he most ideologically extreme
incumbents raise US$306,557 more [from small donors] than their most
moderate colleagues . . . .”209 In fact, the effect of an incumbent’s extremism
on small-donor support is almost three times as great as the effect of the
competitiveness of the election.210 Thus, Culberson et al. conclude that small
donors are not as “benign as [one advocate] suggests,” but in fact may
modestly contribute to the further ideological polarization of Congress.211
Similarly, Johnson found that an incumbent’s “ideological extremism
improves his or her changes of rising a greater proportion of funds from
individual donors in general and small individual contributors in
particular.”212 This work finds an even “closer relationship between
contributions and extremism in recent years” for small donors who give
below $200.213 This trend started to become more pronounced in the late
1990s and early 2000s, which Johnson attributes to the growth of online
fundraising technologies that were still in their early stages at the time of his
work.214
One of the leading advocates for small-donor funding has been the
Campaign Finance Institute, under the direction of Michael Malbin.215 CFI
has headed up a research project to study and promote the advantages of
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that the “ideology of recipient candidates is a weak predictor of contributor ideology.” Id. at 22.
In contrast, Bonica and Barber both believe their data bears out a consistent relationship between
donations and ideology and that donations are a reliable measure of the contributor’s ideology.
Adam Bonica, Are Donation-Based Measures of Ideology Valid Predictors of Individual Level Policy Preferences?,
81 J. POL. 327 (2018), available at https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1086
/700722; Barber, supra note 104.
Tyler Culberson, Michael P. McDonald & Suzanne M. Robbins, Small Donors in Congressional
Elections, 47 AM. POL. RES. 970, 986–87 (2019).
Id. at 989.
Id.
Johnson, supra note 189, at 906.
Id. at 892.
Id. at 903.
As of July 1, 2018, the Campaign Finance Institute is now a branch of the National Institute on
Money in Politics (“NIMP”). Good News for Democracy Watchers: The Campaign Finance Institute is Moving
to the National Institute on Money in State Politics, CAMPAIGN FIN. INST. (May 8, 2018),
http://cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/18-05-08/The_Campaign_Finance_Institute_Is_Moving_to_t
he_National_Institute_on_Money_in_State_Politics.aspx.
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small donors in the campaign finance context. In general, their research
reports have emphasized the favorable democratic effects of small donors,
including on raising the level of participation and the representativeness of
donors.216 Malbin acknowledges the concern that small donors are
polarizing,217 but he pushes back against it. His arguments and evidence,
however, are not strong enough, in my view, to overcome concerns that
small-donor financing systems will contribute to the polarization of politics.
First, although Malbin noted in an early 2007 report that one survey of
donors to state elections suggested small donors had less-extreme policy
preferences than large donors, he acknowledged this was but one survey and
did not give it a lot of weight.218 Instead, his main structure of argument as
a general matter is to note that the evidence does not yet show that small
donors are more polarizing than other individual donors.219 Even if that turns
out to be the case, it would not be a response, of course, to the larger concern
that designing the campaign-finance system to depend so heavily on
individual donors contributes to political polarization. If all reform efforts
are channeled toward small-donation financing, without considering other
alternatives, such as public financing, that do not further entrench the
polarizing role of money, small-donor advocates might send us down a path
that further fuels the ideological poles of our current politics.
Second, Malbin fends off some of the more anecdotal evidence invoked
to suggest small donors are polarizing. He is appropriately concerned about
relying too heavily on stories which emphasize that, in the 2011–2012 cycle,
for example, candidates from the ideological extremes, like Bachmann,
Grayson, and Alan West were among the most successful small donor
fundraisers.220 Instead, Malbin argued shortly after this election cycle that
these kinds of candidates are “polarizing figures whose strident comments
have gained them national recognition after appearances on cable television”
216
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For example, they conclude small donations can act as a gateway to greater nonfinancial electoral
participation by lower-income citizens. See Michael J. Malbin et al., The CFI Small Donor Project: An
Overview of the Project and a Preliminary Report on State Legislative Candidates’ Perspectives on Donors and
Volunteers, CAMPAIGN FIN. INST. (2007), http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/books-reports/CFI_SmallDonor_APSA-paper_2007.pdf.
See Joe et al., supra note 163, at 11.
Id. (finding that “[a]cross a broad range of traditionally polarizing issues, the intensity of small
donors’ preference for near-term state action usually falls between that of the non-donors and large
donors.”).
Id.
Malbin, supra note 178, at 396; MICHAEL J. MALBIN, CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., CITIZEN FUNDING
FOR ELECTIONS 26 (2015), http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/books-reports/CFI_CitizenFundingfor
Elections.pdf.
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and thus they received many more donations as a result of air time.221 In
other words, if the media did not give such ideological extreme candidates so
much air time, they would not be so successful at small-donor fundraising.
The relationship between cable and social media exposure and the ability to
finance campaigns effectively was confirmed by Hillary Clinton’s 2016
campaign manager, who has said: “It used to be that money drove your
ability to put out your message. . . . Now, it’s what you’re saying on cable
and on social media that drives contributions. The old model of using big
resources to make your case to voters—that’s not really how it works
anymore.”222
But Malbin’s answer here is not a strong response to the concern that
small-donor matching programs will enhance the weight of the ideological
poles in both parties, particularly as compared to traditional forms of public
financing: the media has its own incentives that lead it to highlight such
candidates, and as long as that is the case, such candidates will do better with
small donors than more moderate candidates who do not get similar national
exposure.
Malbin also countered the anecdotal evidence from the 2011–2012 cycle
with some additional anecdotal information of his own:
When one considers all of the incumbents who raised $250,000 or more from
small donors, almost exactly half had liberalism (or conservatism) scores
above the median for all members of their own party and the other half fell
below their full party’s midpoint. That is, the top 5% of all incumbents in
small-donor receipts (i.e., the 28 incumbents above $250,000) were
randomly distributed within their own parties ideologically. The parties may
be polarized for many reasons, but these incumbents were no different in
their policy positions from their large-donor-funded cohorts.223

Malbin and the CFI, as advocates for small-donor financing, continue to
resist the conclusion that small donors are polarizing sources of money. But
at best, the strongest form of their argument is that small donors are not
obviously more polarizing than larger donors. And none of their work comes
to terms yet with the recent, more systematic and quantitative studies that
indicate small donors are even more polarized than larger donors.
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Malbin, supra note 178, at 396.
Bykowicz, supra note 63.
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D. The Motivations for Donating
1. All Individual Donors
To assess whether individual donors in general and small donors in
particular help fuel political polarization more than other sources of private
money for campaigns, it is also helpful to examine work regarding the
motivations with which different types of donors contribute to campaigns.
For individual donors, a great deal of evidence supports the conclusion
that ideological beliefs and issues are particularly central to the motivation
for giving. For presidential campaigns (2008 and 2012), Magleby et al. found
that more donors identified the issue position of the candidates as a
motivation for giving than any other single motivation.224 For example, 95%
of Obama and McCain donors in 2008 said that the issue positions of the
candidates were “very important to them.”225 And 96% of Obama and
Romney donors said the same in 2012.226
Bonica has studied in detail the motivations for those individual donors
who give most frequently to a campaign. For these donors, the ideology of a
specific candidate is a greater motivation than other potential motivations,
such as gaining access or seeking to maximize the overall electoral prospects
of the donor’s preferred political party.227 This study focused on individual
donors who had given twenty-five times (no matter the amount) between
2004 and 2012.228 Bonica compared an “ideological model” of contributions
to two competing models that had more of an instrumental or “strategic”
dimension.229 The first of these strategic models is an access-based
motivation account for giving, with “contributions as payments in a market
for votes, legislative services, and access.”230 The second strategic model
speculates that donors might be giving as part of an overall partisan electoral
strategy; this approach “views donors as ideologically motivated but posits
that they engage in electorally minded strategies which lead them to direct
funds to candidates in marginal races in order to influence the partisan
composition of Congress.”231 Bonica finds that the ideological model
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consistently outperforms the access or partisan electoral models and that
“ideological giving is pervasive among the most active individual donors.”232
In the end, Bonica concludes that “ideology trumps strategy” for these
frequent contributors.233
In a 2016 study of a larger set of donors (and not just “repeat” or “active”
individual donors), Barber confirmed that ideological agreement with the
candidate is central to individual donors.234 Barber specifically studied large
donors, using FEC data to study donors who donated more than $200 to
Senators seeking re-election in 2012.235 Barber found that ideological
agreement was “the most important consideration [for donors], with close to
90 percent of respondents” indicating that ideological agreement with the
recipient was either “extremely important” or “somewhat important” to
them.236 Barber also found that “the ideology of the opposing candidate and
the perceived ability to affect the election outcome are also an important
consideration for many donors,” with nearly 80% of donors indicating both
of these concerns were important to them.237
Barber’s work on the importance of the opponent’s ideology to individual
donors is consistent with previous findings from Pew Research Center. In
2014, Pew found that Republicans who “hold a very unfavorable opinion of
the Democratic Party” are almost “twice as likely to have made a donation
to a campaign or candidate” compared to Republicans who hold “mostly
unfavorable” views.238 The same held true of Democrats—those with a
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Id. at 374–75.
Id. at 383. Similarly, in 2017, Hersh & Schaffner found that among individual donors (those who
had given $200–$2,700 to presidential and congressional candidates), “the most common
motivation cited for the contribution is that the candidate is a good person and a competent
politician or that the politician shares similar issue positions as the donor.” Eitan D. Hersh & Brian
F. Schaffner, Motivations of Political Donations: An Audit 9 (Apr. 14, 2017) (draft),
https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Motivations-of-Political-Contributor
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Michael Barber, Donation Motivations: Testing Theories of Access and Ideology, 69 POL. RES. Q. 148
(2016).
Id. at 152.
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PEW RES. CTR., POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 40–41 (2014),
https://www.people-press.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2014/06/6-12-2014-Political-Polari
zation-Release.pdf [hereinafter Pew Expanded Report]. This trend also held for donations to
presidential candidates in 2004. The unacceptability of a candidate’s opponent was a “very
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“very unfavorable opinion of the GOP are substantially more likely than
those who feel only mostly unfavorably to have made a donation in the past
two years (22% vs. 14%).”239 In 2017, Hill & Huber also confirmed this
pattern, finding that the “act of contributing is more likely the greater the
relative ideological distance the individual perceives between her most and
least preferred party,” which Hill & Huber “interpret as evidence that the
stakes of the outcome motivate donation behavior.”240
Moreover, Barber also found a “previously undocumented pattern in
donor motivations,” showing that “the most ideologically extreme donors are
even more likely to be motivated by ideology when giving.”241 That is,
ideologically extreme donors were more likely than moderate donors to say
that the recipient’s ideology and the opponent’s ideology were important
factors to them in deciding to donate.242
In 2017, Barber sought to determine how donors chose to distribute funds
among candidates.243 Essentially, he wanted to know whether donors are
general “partisan boosters” or if they “instead sophisticatedly differentiate
among members with respect to their policy records” when they donate.244
Using a data set of approximately 2800 donors who gave $200 or more to a
Senate candidate in 2012, Barber found that donors were not “merely
partisan boosters,” but instead could “distinguish among incumbents on the
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important” factor in the decision to donate for about 70% of both small and large donors in 2004.
IPDI Report, supra note 152, at 25.
Pew Expanded Report, supra note 238, at 41.
Hill & Huber, supra note 117, at 6.
Barber, supra note 234, at 153.
Barber provided an illustration of this pattern in the figure below:

Id. (showing the ideological distribution of those who donate because of candidate ideology,
opponent ideology, and to affect election outcomes).
Michael J. Barber et al., supra note 104.
Id. at 271, 273.
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basis of roll-call records.”245 For example, Barber found that a “one standard
deviation increase in policy agreement [between the donor and candidate],
which corresponds to approximately three roll calls” would translate into a
“52% increase in the probability of giving to that incumbent.”246 Issue
agreement between the donor and candidate also increased the chances of
donating for donors who belonged to the same party and same state as the
incumbent candidate.247 Barber interpreted this to mean that “contributors
are not giving to a senator simply because she represents the state and shares
a partisan affiliation; instead, their likelihood of donating depends upon rollcall behavior.”248 Importantly, Barber also found that individual donors
were not more “likely to give to politicians who are committee chairs, who
are on finance and appropriations committees, who are members of the
majority party, or who are long-term incumbents with institutional
power.”249 This suggests, as many other studies have found, that individual
donors donate for ideological purposes, rather than for access-oriented
purposes.
Barber specifically acknowledged that his sample only tested those who
gave more than $200. However, Barber noted that he found similar results
between donors, no matter how much they gave. For example, Barber found
“substantively similar results if we examine donors who gave no more than
$200 to a senator versus larger amounts, or even between those who gave
$200 and those who gave over $2,000.”250
Barber also found that the ideological extremity of the donor did not have
a consistent effect on a donor’s willingness to contribute to a candidate.
While Barber found that “a donor’s ideological extremity reduces the
likelihood of contributing to a given senator,” Barber also found that “among
the same survey respondents, the probability of donating to President
Obama is positively correlated with ideological extremity.”251 Barber
speculated that ideological extremity may “influence[] Senate donations in
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ways that are distinct from House or presidential contributions,” but did not
pursue the topic further.252
Finally, in a recent study, Heerwig compiled a new data set, consisting of
“15 million individual FEC contribution records from 1980 through 2008 to
identify the population of unique contributors.”253 She identified “a sharp
increase in partisan donor strategies since the early 1990s” and suggests that
“relatively newer donors are more likely to exercise partisan strategies” and
that some “existing donors have switched to partisan strategies.”254 Just as
split-ticket voting has declined, so has “split contributing”: for most of the
1980s, about 17% of individual donors contributed to both parties, while in
2008, only 7% did so.255 In possible tension with some of Bonica’s findings,
she concluded that in earlier periods of her study, repeat individual
contributors were “less ideologically extreme”; she found “a persistent
positive association between frequency of giving and bipartisan or ‘split
contributing,’” suggesting that ideology may be less important than strategy
for some segments of the individual donor population.256 But the differences
with Bonica’s findings might reflect the fact her study begins in 1980, while
his begins in 2004, and as Heerwig notes, the motivations and patterns
behind frequent individual donations appears to have shifted starting in the
early 1990s.257
2. Small Donors
Research specifically on the motivations of small donors is not nearly as
developed as that for individual donors in general. But the research that does
exists suggest small donors might be even more strongly motivated by
ideological considerations than larger donors.
Joe and his co-authors, for example, found in one study that ideological
motives are indeed more central to small donors than to large donors.258 In
their study of small and large donors across seven states, they found that small
donors are more likely to say that a “candidate’s liberalism or conservatism”
is an important reason to donate than are medium donors, and that medium
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donors in turn are more likely to say this than large donors.259 The same
pattern existed for a “candidate’s views on social or moral issues” as a reason
to donate—that factor is most important to small donors, then to medium
donors, and lastly for large donors.260 Overall, large donors were more likely
than small donors to cite material reasons for giving.261
In a recent study of small donors in House elections from 2006–2010,
Culberson et al. also found that small donors are not likely to give for material
or access-oriented reasons.262 In line with other research, Culberson et. al
confirm that small donors are highly purposive donors who donate for
ideological reasons.263 But this work noted an interesting asymmetry, which
further work will have to explore: small donors only rewarded the extremism
of incumbents. That is, small donors apparently were not as motivated to
reward extremism in challengers or in non-incumbent candidates.264
Culberson et al. speculate this might mean that “candidates must first
establish a record of their ideological extremism . . . through congressional
votes” before small donors are willing to donate to reward extremism.265
The IPDI Report discussed earlier, from the days before small donations
grew dramatically, did not find dramatic differences in the motivations of
large and small donors, but did find that small donors to Bush and Kerry
were more likely than large donors to say that a candidate’s liberalism or
conservatism motivated them to contribute (the effect was much larger for
Bush donors).266 And small donors to Bush and Kerry were more likely than
large donors to say that a candidate’s views on social and moral issues
motivated them to contribute.267 Small donors to both candidates were also
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Tyler Culberson et al., Small Donors in Congressional Elections, 47 AM. POL. RES. 970, 985 (2019).
Id. at 986–87.
Id. at 989. The correlation between small donor money and incumbent extremism was also quite
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more likely to say that they believed their donations would be “a way to
influence government policies.”268
Finally, Rhodes, Schaffner & La Raja studied how donors choose to
allocate their funds among candidates.269 This work was similar to Barber’s
work on ideologically sophisticated donors, but Rhodes et al. were able to
study donors who gave any amount, not just large donors.270 Rhodes et al.
sorted donors into different categories of “donor classes” depending on
donation strategy.
These four donor classes included “Party-Oriented Donors, who
contribute mostly to the political parties; Local-Oriented Donors, who
donate to races in their own states; Idiosyncratic Donors, who tend to donate
intermittently without a clear strategy; and Nationalized Donors, who are
especially notable for their tendency to donate to House and Senate
candidates outside their states.”271 Rhodes et al. expected that donors “who
hold issue positions that are more extreme, who are more politically engaged,
and who are more partisan will be more motivated to pursue highly strategic
donation strategies that exhibit indications of discernment in the choice of
recipients.”272 Thus, Rhodes et. al expected politically extreme donors to
give to out-of-jurisdiction candidates and to be “less likely to give to parties
because these organizations may often support candidates with whom they
disagree.”273 While this study found this to be true of ideological large donors
(they often gave out-of-jurisdiction to preferred candidates), they also found
that donors with “more limited funds were more likely either to donate in an
idiosyncratic manner, or to concentrate their contributions on a relatively
268

269
270
271
272
273

IPDI Report, supra note 152, at 27. The Report also included qualitative information, based on
personal interviews with some donors. The following passage sheds some light on the motivations
of those small donors who were interviewed:
[I]n our personal interviews we found donors whom we call “pragmatic donors,” and most
of these were small donors to also-ran candidates. These donors expressed pragmatic,
even politically strategic, motives for making a donation. They were politically savvy and
knowledgeable of campaign strategies such as raising money to dissuade a potential
opponent or to show a burst of popular support. They liked the candidates they
contributed money to, but did not necessarily expect or even want them to win. Their
donations were instead aimed at encouraging the democratic process or keeping an
alternative viewpoint in the campaign. They wanted a candidate they believed would lose
to nonetheless stay in the race longer. They wanted a candidate’s positions heard, even if
they did not fully support those positions. They gave money as a protest or out of a sense
of duty. These donors do not neatly fit in to the typical explanations we use to explain
why people give money to a political candidate.
Id. at 28.
Jesse H. Rhodes et al., Detecting and Understanding Donor Strategies in Midterm Elections, 71 POL. RES. Q.
503, 503 (2018).
Id.
Id. at 504.
Id. at 508.
Id. at 505–06.
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obvious target, the political parties.”274 These results do not necessarily
contradict the other studies that find that small donors are more motivated
by ideology in their decision to donate than large donors; the small donors’
“idiosyncratic” donations, for instance, could be directed towards highly
ideological candidates.
IV. LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS AND SMALL DONORS:
VOUCHERS AND MATCHING PROGRAMS
Much of the reform energy around small donors has been based on the
actual experience with legislatively enacted small-donor-based systems
already in place in a few local governments. In my view, it is hazardous to
generalize from these programs to how small-donor-based systems would
work at elections for higher office, particularly for national offices. Localgovernment campaigns tend to be based less on broad ideological partisan
differences, instead focusing on more pragmatic, local issues; moreover, they
attract much less money from outside the jurisdiction than national elections,
and such outside money tends to be all the more ideologically based and
hence polarized. Nonetheless, it is important to learn what we can from the
small-donor programs already in place at the local level, in part because
reformers rely heavily on such experiments.
A. Voucher Programs
Voucher systems for election financing have long been a favorite of
academic campaign-finance reformers.275 They are one type of reform that
extolls the role of individual, small donors. Essentially a particular form of
publicly subsidized campaign financing, voucher systems involve
governments distributing to eligible voters vouchers worth a certain dollar
amount, which voters can then use to contribute as they see fit to campaigns.
The theory behind such proposals is that they combine the anticorruption aspirations of small-donor-based financing with an egalitarian
274
275

Id. at 514.
The first such published proposal seems to have appeared in Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-PerVoter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM L. REV. 1204 (1994). Other prominent
discussions of voucher programs can be found in the legal academic literature of Richard L. Hasen,
Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84
CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1996) and BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYERS, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW
PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE (2002).
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commitment by equalizing the capacity of all voters to make small donations
in the amount of the vouchers. Thus, when it comes time for academics who
have spent years chronicling the problems with American democracy to offer
fixes, figures like Benjamin Page and Martin Gilens seize on voucher
programs; as they assert, democracy vouchers could “equalize the moneybased influence of every citizen, rather than just magnify the clout of small
to medium-sized donors.”276 Indeed, the recently introduced voting-reform
bill introduced in the House, H.R. 1, contemplates a possible nationwide
voucher program, with pilot efforts to begin in several states.277
But even though all voters are theoretically enabled by such systems to
contribute, the question remains how many, and which, voters will in
practice be motivated and informed enough to participate in these systems.
As always, it is important not to be swept up in the democratic, romantic
illusion that most citizens are as engaged by politics as the academics and
reform activists who support these proposals. As I have written before:
“Participation has to be energized, organized, mobilized, and channeled in
effective directions—all of which requires the very organizations, and the
partisans, that ‘citizen’ participation is meant to bypass.”278
In 2015, the first actual voucher system in the nation was adopted, by
voter initiative, in Seattle.279 Ironically, in light of concerns reformers
typically have about the role of money in politics, advocates for the “Honest
Elections” system massively outspent their opponents, on the order of 30:1,
with more than half the money coming from outside Seattle.280 Moreover,
the average contribution to the campaign was $7134—a huge sum compared
to the average contribution in the most expensive City Council race in the
prior system, which was $166.281 Large amounts of outside money have thus
helped make Seattle the first test case for voucher programs.
As a result of this successful initiative, in 2017 Seattle distributed four $25
vouchers to every Seattle resident eighteen years or older and eligible under
276
277
278
279

280
281

BENJAMIN I. PAGE & MARTIN GILENS, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA? WHAT HAS GONE WRONG
AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 192 (2017).
For the People Act of 2019, H.R. 1, 116th Cong. §§ 5100–5501 (2019).
Richard H. Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmentation, and the Decline of American Government,
124 YALE L.J. 804, 824 (2014).
CITY OF SEATTLE ETHICS AND ELECTIONS COMM’N, SEATTLE DEMOCRACY VOUCHER
PROGRAM EVALUATION 2 (2018), https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/Ethics
Elections/DemocracyVoucher/DVP%20Evaluation%20Final%20Report%20April%2025%202
018.pdf [hereinafter Program Evaluation].
Bob Young, ‘Democracy Vouchers’ Win in Seattle; First in Country, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 4, 2015),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/democracy-vouchers/.
Id.
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local law to donate to a campaign.282 There was public disclosure of any
voucher contributor’s name, the candidate to whom the voucher was
assigned, and the date of contribution.283 This first election applied to
candidates for City Council and City Attorney. To participate in the
program, candidates first had to demonstrate a threshold level of popular
support by raising $10 donations from 400 Seattle residents.284 Candidates
who chose to participate agreed to accept limits on their other contributions
($250 per donor) and limits on their election spending.285 Voucher-funded
candidates were released from these spending limits, however, if spending for
their opponents—both spending by their campaign and independent
spending on their behalf—exceeded the spending limits imposed on voucherfunded candidates, a provision that raises constitutional questions.286 First

282

283

284
285
286

In Seattle, this includes lawful permanent resident aliens. JENNIFER HEERWIG & BRIAN J.
MCCABE, U. WASH. CTR. FOR STUD. IN DEMOGRAPHY & ECOLOGY, EXPANDING
PARTICIPATION IN MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS:
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF SEATTLE’S
DEMOCRACY VOUCHER PROGRAM 5 (2018), https://csde.washington.edu/wp-content/uploads
/2018/04/Seattle-Voucher-4.03.pdf [hereinafter Heerwig & McCabe Report]; CITY OF SEATTLE,
DEMOCRACY VOUCHER PROGRAM, http://www.seattle.gov/democracyvoucher/i-am-a-seattleresident (last visited Jan. 10, 2020) (clarifying that vouchers may be used by green card holders).
Program Evaluation, supra note 279, at 5–6. For a study that attempts to explore whether these
disclosure requirements chilled donations from certain potential donor groups—particularly those
whose political views are at odds with the majority preferences of their neighbors, see Abby K.
Wood et al., Mind the (Participation) Gap: Vouchers, Voting, and Visibility, (U.C. Davis Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, No. 19-9, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=3354826 (finding political outliers in their neighborhoods are no more or less likely to make
use of vouchers than those whose ideology is closer to that of their neighbors).
Heerwig & McCabe Report, supra note 282, at 5.
Program Evaluation, supra note 279, at 6.
Id. at 6–7. In Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721 (2011), the
Supreme Court invalidated the “trigger” provision in Arizona’s clean-money financing system, a
provision many other public-financing states employed as well. In Arizona, if a privately funded
candidate spent more than the level the publicly funded candidate was permitted to spend, all
publicly funded opponents had the right to receive an additional public grant equal to the privately
funded candidate’s excess spending, up to three times the original public grant, and was also freed
from all spending caps. Arizona Free Enterprise Club, 564 U.S. at 728. Moreover, independent
spending on behalf of a privately funded candidate was also counted as part of that candidate’s
spending and thus could also further the trigger. Id. at 728–29. Because the Arizona scheme that
was struck down both provided additional public funds and lifted the spending cap, the decision
leaves open the question whether simply lifting the spending cap for a publicly funded candidate,
once a privately funded candidate spends more than this amount, would be constitutional. Richard
Briffault, Reforming Campaign Finance Reform: The Future of Public Financing, in DEMOCRACY BY THE
PEOPLE: REFORMING CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN AMERICA 103, 116 (Eugene D. Mazo & Timothy
K. Kuhner eds., 2018).
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Amendment doctrine also prohibits candidates from being forced to
participate in such systems, so any participation must be voluntary.287
Candidate participation in the 2017 local races under Seattle’s voucher
program was high. Out of the fifteen candidates for the two city council seats
at stake, twelve candidates sought to participate in the program (though only
five managed to achieve enough threshold support to qualify).288 All four of
the candidates who advanced to the general election for both seats
participated.289 In the City Attorney’s race, the incumbent (and eventual
winner) participated in the program, while the challenger did not. In 2019,
the democracy voucher program will be available for the remaining seven
seats for Seattle’s City Council, and in 2021, the program will be available in
the Seattle Mayor’s race.290
1. Which Voters Make Use of Vouchers?
In the 2017 election—the only voucher-financed one on which data was
available at the time this Article went to press—the voucher program did, as
expected, increase the number of donors relative to the prior, purely private
fundraising system. A detailed, local post-election report on the effects of the
voucher program found that over 20,000 Seattle residents used their
vouchers to contribute to the eligible campaigns.291 This was double the
number of cash contributors in the prior, 2015 election cycle.292 About 5000
residents made cash donations to these same candidates.293 This report also
found that “[n]early 9 out of 10 voucher users had never previously
contributed to a candidate for local office in Seattle.”294 Yet before
celebrating these numbers unequivocally, we need to keep them in

287
288
289
290

291
292
293
294

Counting independent expenditures in this way is problematic, as the Seattle experience illustrates.
In the city attorney’s race, a non-voucher candidate tried to remain below the spending limit, so as
to avoid releasing his voucher-funded opponent from the spending cap. But an independent group
then made an expenditure against the voucher-funded candidate, which pushed total spending
“for” his opponent over the threshold and thus released the voucher-funded candidate from the
spending limits he had voluntarily agreed to. Program Evaluation, supra note 279, at 20.
See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
Program Evaluation, supra note 279, at 13.
Id.
Jennifer A. Heerwig & Brian J. McCabe, Diversifying the Donor Pool: How Did Seattle’s Democracy
Vouchers Program Reshape Participation in Municipal Campaign Finance?, 18 ELECTION L.J. 323, 327 n.6
(2019) [hereinafter Diversifying the Donor Pool].
Heerwig & McCabe Report, supra note 282, at 1.
Program Evaluation, supra note 279, at i.
Heerwig & McCabe Report, supra note 282, at 1.
Program Evaluation, supra note 279, at i.
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perspective: only about 3.4% of people who were eligible to use vouchers
did so, even though the time involved in using a voucher is no different than
voting by mail, which is how people in Washington vote.295
Similarly, while voucher users were also found to be somewhat more
representative of Seattle’s population than cash donors, the differences were
small. And voucher users were still highly unrepresentative of voters overall.
Compared to cash donors, for example, voucher users were more likely to be
women, people of color, younger in age, less affluent,296 and local residents.297
Thus, 27% of voucher users were “young people” (aged 18–35), compared
to only 9% of cash donors, according to the organization Every Voice
Center.298 Similarly, compared to the pool of cash donors, “[n]eighborhoods
with household incomes below the city median saw a 42 percent
improvement in the share of their giving among voucher donors.”299
Yet even so, Jennifer Heerwig and Brian McCabe have shown that
voucher users are still quite unrepresentative of Seattle as a whole. Heerwig
and McCabe are also the only researchers who have reported on the political
makeup and political participation of voucher users. Not surprisingly, the
same variables that affect political participation in general also show up in
participation in the voucher program. Heerwig and McCabe found that,
compared to the broader Seattle electorate, voucher users were more likely
to be wealthy, white, older, and politically active.300 For example, “[o]lder
residents in Seattle were three times more likely to participate than younger
residents” and “[w]hites were almost twice as likely to return their vouchers
as blacks.”301 Higher-income residents were also much more likely to return
295
296

297

298
299
300
301

Id. at 22; WASH. SEC’Y OF STATE, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON VOTING BY MAIL,
https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/faq_vote_by_mail.aspx (last visited Jan. 10, 2020).
EVERY VOICE CTR., FIRST LOOK: SEATTLE’S DEMOCRACY VOUCHERS PROGRAM: REDUCING
THE POWER OF BIG MONEY AND EXPANDING POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 2 (2017),
https://everyvoice.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/2017-11-15-Seattle-Post-Election-ReportFINAL.pdf [hereinafter Every Voice Center Report].
In 2015, contributors to city council races who resided outside of Seattle made up 29% of the donor
pool, compared to only 7% of donors in 2017. Ron Fein, The Impact of Seattle’s Democracy Voucher
Program on Candidates’ Ability to Rely on Constituents for Fundraising 2 (Free Speech for the People, Issue
Report 2018-01, 2018), https://freespeechforpeople.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/FSFPIssue-Report-2018_1.pdf. In contrast, the percentage of outside contributors remained steady
(23% vs. 22.6%) in the Mayor’s race, which did not use vouchers. Id.
Every Voice Center Report, supra note 296, at 4.
Id.
See generally Heerwig & McCabe Report, supra note 282, at 1.
Id. at 2.
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their vouchers. Approximately “5 percent of individuals with an annual
income above $75,000 participated in the Democracy Voucher program, but
only about 2 percent of individuals with an annual income below $30,000
participated in the program.”302
The voucher program did not magically turn less-engaged citizens into
active participants. Overall, Heerwig and McCabe found that “individuals
who were already politically engaged, as measured by previous voting
behavior, were more likely to return their vouchers than registered voters
who rarely voted in elections.”303 Specifically:
Among registered voters who voted in every election for which they were
registered, more than 8 percent returned their Democracy Vouchers. On
the other hand, among registered voters who voted in fewer than half of the
elections for which they were eligible to vote, only about 1 percent
participated in the Democracy Vouchers program. 304

Moreover, vouchers do not appear to dampen the level of independent
spending in elections; in both 2015 and 2017, independent spending
amounted to about 19% of total spending.305
2. Do Vouchers Fuel Polarization?
As noted above, it is a mistake to generalize from local-government
campaign-finance systems, including voucher programs, to how such
programs would operate in national elections. For Seattle’s first experiment
with vouchers, not enough data yet exists for any systematic assessment of
whether such programs differentially empower candidates from the
ideological poles. Voucher users were somewhat more liberal than the pool
of Seattle’s registered voters.306 Overall, 95% of voucher users described
themselves as “liberal,” compared to 88% of Seattle’s registered voters.307
While 10% of Seattle’s registered voters described themselves as “moderate,”
only 3% of voucher users described themselves in the same way.308
An examination of one City Council race, however, might provide a bit
of insight into the relationship between voucher donors and candidate
ideology. In one open-seat City Council election, both candidates who
advanced to the general election, Teresa Mosqueda and Jon Grant,
302
303
304
305
306
307
308

Id.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 2.
Program Evaluation, supra note 279, at 21.
Diversifying the Donor Pool, supra note 290, at 39 tbl.2.
Id.
Id.
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participated in the voucher program and raised the maximum voucher
amount of $300,000.309 Mosqueda, the eventual winner, was backed by
labor unions and described as the “quintessential establishment candidate”
by the Seattle Times.310 In addition to $300,000 from vouchers, Mosqueda
raised approximately $158,000 in other in-kind contributions (primarily
from unions and PACs).311 Vouchers thus accounted for approximately 65%
of her fundraising haul, and she would have been a viable candidate even
without the vouchers program.312
Jon Grant, the other general election candidate, identified with the
Socialist Alternative Party313 and was described as the “socialist-favorite”
candidate.314 In addition to $300,000 from vouchers, Grant raised
approximately $59,000 in other in-kind contributions.315 Vouchers thus
accounted for approximately 84% of his fundraising haul.316 Grant,
therefore, was almost entirely dependent on voucher money and would have
been outspent approximately 3-1 without vouchers. For other voucherfunded races, seemingly moderate candidates were unable to raise close to
the maximum of voucher dollars.317
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Bob Young, M. Lorena González and Teresa Mosqueda Win Seattle City Council Seats, SEATTLE TIMES
(Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/seattle-city-council-election2017/.
Editorial, The Times Editorial Board Recommends: Jon Grant, Seattle City Council, Position 8, SEATTLE
TIMES (Oct. 16, 2017, 3:54 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/editorials/the-timesrecommends-jon-grant-seattle-city-council-position-8/.
SEATTLE ETHICS AND ELECTION COMM’N, CITY COUNCIL POSITION 8: TERESA MOSQUEDA,
http://web6.seattle.gov/ethics/elections/campaigns.aspx?cycle=2017&type=campaign&IDNum
=533&leftmenu=expanded (last visited Jan. 10, 2020).
Id.
González Holds on to Council Position, Mosqueda Wins Open Seat, K5 NEWS (Nov. 9, 2017, 4:00 PM)
https://www.king5.com/article/news/local/seattle/gonzalez-holds-on-to-council-position-mosq
ueda-wins-open-seat/490022314.
Seattle City Council Hopefuls Rely on Democracy Vouchers to Help Fund Race, Q13 FOX (Oct. 18, 2017, 7:37
PM), https://q13fox.com/2017/10/18/seattle-city-council-hopefuls-rely-on-democracy-vouchers
-to-help-fund-race/.
SEATTLE ETHICS AND ELECTION COMM’N, CITY COUNCIL POSITION 8: JON GRANT,
http://web6.seattle.gov/ethics/elections/campaigns.aspx?cycle=2017&type=campaign&IDNum
=525&leftmenu=expanded (last visited Jan. 10, 2020).
Id.
See, e.g., SEATTLE ETHICS AND ELECTION COMM’N, CITY COUNCIL POSITION 9: AT-LARGE,
http://web6.seattle.gov/ethics/elections/campaigns.aspx?cycle=2017&type=contest&IDNum=1
56&leftmenu=expanded (last visited Jan. 10, 2020). The voucher program did appear to have the
intended effect of increasing the percentage of campaign contributions that came from small
donors. In 2013, small donors (defined as donors who gave $250 or less) accounted for 48% of the
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Among reform groups, such as the Center for Popular Democracy,318
Brennan Center for Justice,319 Every Voice Center,320 and Free Speech for
People, Seattle’s first experiment with vouchers has been heralded as a great
success. Indeed, some voucher proponents assure us that “Democracy
Vouchers are doable” and the “same idea could be applied to federal
elections for Congress.”321 These claims, however, entail comparing the
voucher system to the prior, privately financed system. The comparison
implicitly takes off the table more traditional forms of public financing. It is
a peculiarly American system of “public financing” to endorse such an
individualistic mode of public financing, in which the flow of public funds is
based entirely on how individuals decide to make use—if at all—of the public
subsidies meant to empower them. Moreover, little of the celebration of
voucher programs addresses the issue of whether such programs are likely to
further fuel political polarization. The current flush of enthusiasm for smalldonor finance systems, including voucher programs, risks crowding out of
reform and public discussion the more traditional forms of public financing
used in most democracies.

318

319

320
321

donations to City Council and City Attorney races. Every Voice Center Report, supra note 296, at
6. In 2017, small donors and donations from the voucher program made up 87% of the campaign
contributions to City Council and City Attorney races. Id.
See KATE HAMAJI & EMMA GREENMAN, CTR. FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY, DEEPENING OUR
DEMOCRACY: HOW LOCALITIES CAN EXPAND VOTING RIGHTS 8 (2018), https://populardemo
cracy.org/sites/default/files/20180103%20Voter%20Registration%20Report%20Updated%20
Web.pdf.
See, e.g., Ian Vandewalker, Voucher-Funded Seattle Candidates Relied More on Constituents Than on NonConstituent Donors, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (June 1, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog
/voucher-funded-seattle-candidates-relied-more-constituents-non-constituent-donors-part-two.
See generally Every Voice Center Report, supra note 296.
BENJAMIN I. PAGE & MARTIN GILENS, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA? WHAT HAS GONE WRONG
AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 191–92 (2017). To their credit, Page and Gilens are among
the few proponents of vouchers who recognize the potential that systems of funding based on
individual donors, including small donors, might exacerbate polarization; as they say, “public
financing systems that shift power from business groups to individuals might exacerbate rather than
reduce polarization.” Id. at 219. But not to be deterred, they then go on to say they see this as
“another argument in favor of Democracy Vouchers, which shift money to all citizens equally,
rather than to small private-money donors.” Id. But they offer no explanation as to why those
politically active enough to make use of vouchers will not be just as polarized and polarizing as
other small donors. Implicitly, they seem to assume that once vouchers are available, they will be
widely used, and that the forces of moderation will dominate over those of polarization. This rests
on the same view I have described above, that political participation through vouchers will
immediately spring up and be widespread, rather than be subject to the same problems of
mobilization, organization, and participation that shape every other mode of political participation.
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B. Matching Programs
The forms of public financing that appear to have the most political
support today, at least among Democrats and the usual cast of democraticreform organizations, are small-donor matching programs.322 Much of the
enthusiasm and information about such programs is based on the experience
of New York City, which first enacted this program, for local elections, in
1988, and has had the most generous one in the nation since. As noted
briefly above, for citywide and city council races, New York City provides a
6:1 dollar match for the first $175 of a contribution from a donor a candidate
receives.323 Thus, the first $175 contribution is worth $1050 to the candidate
(this multiple will now be going up to 8:1).324
Reformers are now seeking to transport the New York City model to the
state and national level. In the Democrats’ first proposed piece of legislation
since taking over the House in the 2018 elections, a part of the For the People
Act, as it is called, would create a multiple-matching system, at a 6:1 ratio,
for federal elections.325
The few studies or reports assessing the New York City system,326 some
produced by advocacy organizations,327 do suggest the system: tends to enjoy
considerable participation from candidates; increases the number of overall
contributors and small donors to campaigns; enables candidates who
participate to rely more heavily on small donors than those who do not; turns
fundraising into a form of voter outreach as well; and enables candidates to

322
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See, e.g., Brookings Report, supra note 30, at 40.
Id.
A different kind of matching-funds proposal would seek to empower the political parties. One
version would do so by “allowing national party committees to make unlimited coordinated
expenditures but to do so only from money the parties raise from small donors who give an aggregate
amount of $200 or less.” See id. at 49.
See Tim Lau & Daniel I. Weiner, Historic Bill to Strengthen Democracy Introduced in Congress, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/historic-bill-strengthendemocracy-introduced-congress.
See generally Michael J. Malbin et Al., Small Donors, Big Democracy: New York City’s Matching Funds as a
Model for the Nation and States, 11 ELECTION L. J. 3 (2012).
ELIZABETH GENN ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., DONOR DIVERSITY THROUGH PUBLIC
MATCHING FUNDS (2012), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report
_DonorDiversity-public-matching-funds.PDF; ANGELA MIGALLY & SUSAN LISS, BRENNAN CTR.
FOR JUST., SMALL DONOR MATCHING FUNDS: THE NYC ELECTION EXPERIENCE (2010),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Small-Donor-Matching-Fu
nds-NYC-Experience.pdf.
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run who would not otherwise be competitive absent the matching funds
(perhaps a mixed benefit, if those candidates are more extreme).328
When it comes to the potential relationship between New York City’s
small-donor matching programs and political polarization, though, I am not
aware of any studies that directly engage this issue. But any such study would
be of little benefit anyway for national elections. First, as noted earlier, local
government elections are not typical of elections at higher levels; they tend
to focus less on ideological differences and more on pragmatic questions of
governance (after all, New York City, one of the most Democratic cities in
national elections, has been governed by Republican mayors for nineteen of
the last twenty-five years, if Michael Bloomberg is counted as a Republican,
as he was when first elected). Second, the New York City program matches
only the small-dollar contributions of city residents. Indeed, this feature is
often touted as one of its most significant benefits, for it purportedly makes
candidates more responsive to their constituents. But in the proposed federal
legislation, all small-dollar contributions from anywhere in the country to any
House or Senate candidate would receive the 6:1 match in federal funds.
Money that comes in from outside the jurisdiction is among the most
ideologically driven money of all, of course. A system that matches only local
contributions will function very differently, with respect to polarization, than
one that matches contributions from anywhere. Thus, the New York City
program does not, and most likely could not, tell us anything about whether
small-donor-based financing will enhance polarization at the national
level.329
C. What Happened to Traditional Public Financing?
The aim of this article is not to compare small-donor public financing
with the system of purely private financing that currently characterizes most
American elections. That small donors are even more ideologically
polarizing forces in politics than larger donors is indeed possible, as the
experience with direct-mail financing in the past suggests. If that turns out
to be the case, small-donor based “reforms” might well exacerbate the
polarization of American politics. But we do not yet have enough data to
conclude whether small donors are even more polarizing than larger donors.

328

329

See Malbin et al., supra note 326, at 16–17; Genn et al., supra note 327, at 6; Migally & Liss, supra
note 327, at 2, 10–11, 18.
For discussion of how certain small, statewide matching programs have worked (or not worked), see
infra text accompanying note 346.
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We also, however, do not have significant data that suggests that small donors
are less polarizing forces than individual donors in general.
The comparison that matters for this Article is with traditional forms of
public financing. Only quite recently has small-donor-based public financing
raced to the forefront of reform ideology, seemingly displacing consideration
of other alternatives, including traditional public financing. This Article’s
concern is that in the current flush of enthusiasm for small-donor public
financing, we might be ignoring alternatives that are not as likely to fuel
political polarization.
From the states, we have much more experience with traditional public
financing than with small-donor-based public financing. Currently five states
provide full public-funding grants (AZ, CT, ME, NM, and VT) and three
more provide partial grants.330 In traditional public financing—often called
“clean money” or “clean elections” systems—the government provides
qualifying candidates with grants designed to cover the cost of the campaign.
Public financing must be voluntary, as a constitutional matter,331 and once a
candidate opts in, the candidate typically accepts spending limits and
foregoes raising additional private funds. To qualify and show their viability,
candidates must typically raise a small amount of money, usually in small
amounts, that aggregate to enough dollars to surmount a certain minimal
threshold. As Professor Richard Briffault says, traditional “public funding
probably comes closest in theory to the reform goals of equalizing influence
in the financing of campaigns, reducing the burdens of fundraising, and
freeing government decision-making from the influence of campaign
donors.”332 With respect to polarization, since only a small amount of initial
dollars must be raised from individual donors, it is not likely that more
extreme candidates will be able to surmount that threshold than moremoderate or centrist ones.
So why has small-donor public financing seemingly pushed aside
traditional public financing among reformers? Three possibilities come to
mind, the first two of which are political economy stories. The perception
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and reality might be that there is insufficient political support for traditional
“public financing” of elections. As compared to traditional forms of public
financing, perhaps small-donor matching programs obscure the hand of
public financing, and in so doing make these programs more politically
feasible (even though matching programs are, of course, forms of public
financing). Second, the current celebration of small-donor financing might
reflect herding behavior among the reform community and like-minded
politicians; this has become the reform de jour, and one has to be concerned
about reforms touted as the “salvation” of democracy that do not seriously
engage with the potential downsides of such reforms, particularly their effect
on polarization.333 That is always a worrisome sign of enthusiasm
overwhelming analysis. Third, there are genuine technical problems with
traditional public financing. The problem is how to design the grants so that
they are neither too low nor too high (and adjust over time to remain neither
too high nor too low). If too low, candidates will not be electorally
competitive, and they will not opt into the public-financing system. If too
high, too many fringe candidates will be able to receive public grants, which
increases political fragmentation and might be thought to waste public
money.
To address this problem, states and local governments had added
“trigger” provisions in the 1990s to their “clean elections” systems.334 Most
commonly, the jurisdiction would provide the publicly-funded candidate
with additional public grants, up to a new, higher level, if a privately-financed
candidate spent above a certain level (in some places, the trigger also
included independent spending on behalf of the privately-funded
candidate).335 In some places, the spending limit to which the publiclyfunded candidate was subject would be raised, and the publicly-funded
candidate authorized to raise additional funds.336 But in Arizona Free Enterprise
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Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett,337 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional
the trigger provision in Arizona’s clean-election law, which provided if a
privately-funded candidate spent more than the size of the public grant to
publicly-funded candidates, the latter would receive additional grants equal
to the amount of the private candidate’s spending—up to three times the size
of the original grant. Although the case did not address whether it would be
constitutional simply to lift the spending limit for publicly-funded
candidates—without providing the candidate with additional public funds—
if a privately-financed competitor spends more than the size of the public
grant, Arizona Free Enterprise has been treated as if it eliminates all trigger
formulas.338
The elimination of trigger formulas makes getting the size of the public
grant right far more difficult. These technical problems undoubtedly are part
of the reason matching programs have come to displace “clean elections”
programs among many reform groups. But small-donor matching programs
will face their own technical challenges in implementation. For one, they
must decide whether the match gets capped at a certain total dollar amount
or is unlimited—so that the more small-dollars a candidate raises, the more
public funds he or she receives. If unlimited, a 6:1 matching program would
have provided an absurd $211 million in matching funds in 2018, for
example, to Beto O’Rourke, who raised from small donors about 46% of his
$80 million in contributions.339 But if there is a cap on the match, how is
that dollar figure to be set, and how will it be adjusted to keep up with the
changing costs of different campaigns in different states? The currently
proposed legislation in the House would cap the matching funds so that they
do not “exceed 50% of the average of the 20 greatest amounts of
disbursements made by the authorized committees of any winning candidate
for the office of Representative in . . . the Congress during the most recent
election cycle, rounded to the nearest $100,000.”340
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Similarly, the match must be set at the “right” level and adjusted as
necessary to ensure the purposes of the program continue to be met. The
current proposed national legislation uses a 6:1 matching formula, perhaps
because New York City has used that formula for many years (though the
New York City formula will now go up to 8:1). Is this the right level for all
national races? To get a sense of how small-donor matching programs might
function in high-stakes, competitive races that draw national attention,
consider Florida’s recent 2018 gubernatorial election. Florida matches
contributions of $250 or less at a 1:1 ratio; candidates who accept this money
agree to abide by fixed spending limitations.341 In the recent contest between
Republican Ron DeSantis and Democrat Andrew Gillum, each received
about $2.2–2.3 million in public matching funds. Their direct campaigns
abided by the spending limits. Yet Super PACs spent nearly $41 million for
DeSantis and around $36 million for Gillum. More than $106 million was
spent on the election overall.342 Even if Florida had applied the 6:1 matching
formula, the public funds would have been a small percentage of either
campaign’s financing. If the point of the matching program is to free
campaigns from dependence on larger donors and spenders, the matching
dollars must reach a high-enough aggregate level to create such diminishing
marginal utility for dollars of independent spending as to essentially make
that spending irrelevant.
This exposes a risk with any form of public financing in the United States:
since independent spending cannot constitutionally be prohibited, the public
financing might turn out to be a drop in the bucket and therefore not achieve
much in the way of the reform’s objectives. Public financing in European
democracies is more often than not accompanied by extremely strict limits
on outside spending, limits that would be blatantly unconstitutional under
Buckley v. Valeo.343
Before rushing to abandon traditional public financing in favor of
matching programs, reformers need to confront the risk that the latter will
further fuel political polarization. Versions of public financing that include
a trigger formula, such as one that simply releases candidates from spending
limits, might well be constitutional.
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D. Did the 2018 Elections Change Everything We Had Learned Up Until Then About
Small Donors and Polarization?
All the studies about small donors discussed above pre-date the 2018
elections. As noted above, these elections saw a staggering increase in the
role of small donors in congressional elections. The question is whether the
experience of 2018 requires any significant revision in understanding the
relationship between small donors and polarization.
The most important answer at this stage is that, whatever a full analysis
of the 2018 patterns demonstrates, it will be impossible for some number of
election cycles to know whether these patterns reflect a “new normal” about
the motivations, giving patterns, and beneficiaries of small donors. Perhaps
it will turn out that the 2018 midterms were so unique generalizing from
them would prove to be a mistake. Certainly, they were unique in the level
of voter participation. Turnout was higher than in any mid-term election
since 1914, with about 50.1% of eligible voters going to the polls.344 This
was a dramatic reversal of mid-term turnout levels in prior years; in 2014,
turnout was 36.7%—the lowest in seventy-two years—and since 1974,
turnout in mid-terms had averaged 39.4%.345
In 2018, politics had come to seem existential to many voters: the nature
and future of American democracy was perceived to be at stake, for partisans
on both sides. Partisan control of the House of Representatives and possibly
the Senate were perceived to be up for grabs. With a President facing the
lowest favorability ratings of any President through his first two years,
Democratic voters perceived seizing control of the House as the only means
of providing checks and balances on a President they viewed as threatening
the basic institutions and norms of American democracy. Not surprisingly,
this extraordinary level of intensity in voter participation was also reflected
on the dollars side of the election. Not only was more than $5 billion spent,
for the first time in midterm elections, but total spending leaped up 35% from
the previous midterms in 2014 (for comparison, the increase from 2010 to
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2014 was only 5.7%).346 A significant portion of this huge increase reflected
the dramatic rise in small donors, particularly on the Democratic side, made
possible by the ActBlue website.
Given the extraordinary context of 2018, drawing any general
conclusions about small-donor contribution patterns would be hazardous,
even once there is time to assess those patterns fully. Many organizations
sprang up to encourage Democratic small donors to donate strategically,
rather than ideologically—that is, to give in a way that maximized the party’s
prospects overall to win the House, rather than to give to candidates whose
political views were closest ideologically to that of the donor.347 Thus, many
moderate or centrist candidates benefitted significantly from small donations,
including from out of state. Still, as noted above, the candidates who received
the highest proportion of their contributions from small donors in 2018, in
both parties, appear to have been either from the ideological poles of their
parties or, in one case, in a major leadership role in the House.348 But even
with enough time to assess in depth the pattern of giving in 2018, it will still
be unclear for several more election cycles whether 2018 was unique with
respect to small donors or is a large enough transformation to require putting
aside all we had learned about small donors and polarization up until now.
CONCLUSION
Political engagement in elections can take a variety of forms, ranging
from less intense, such as voting itself, to more active forms, such as: trying
to persuade others to vote for one’s preferred candidates; displaying yard
signs, bumper stickers, and the like; contributing money to campaigns; and
actively working on campaigns, full- or part-time. We also know that, in our
era, the more engaged people are, the more polarized they are.349
Political reforms based on seeking to increase more widespread, direct,
unmediated citizen participation—including basing publicly-financed
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elections on the preferences of individual small donors—thus must confront
the paradox of participation and polarization. Merely making certain forms
of participation available, such as by providing campaign vouchers or the
ability to contribute small sums via today’s technology, does not mean that
the vast majority of citizens or even voters will jump at the opportunity to
participate. There is every reason to think that, as participation in these new
modes comes to be organized and mobilized, we will see the same patterns
of polarization emerge. Traditional forms of public financing, involving
grants not so directly tied to the immediate preferences of small donors or
voucher users, are likely to do less to empower the ideological extremes than
these newer forms of public funding.
American democracy has long envisioned itself as grounded in ideologies
of “popular sovereignty” and the role of the individual, sovereign citizen that
valorizes unmediated individual control of democracy far more than do most
other major democracies. Dating back to the Jacksonian era, we have
exhibited greater distrust of elites, of intermediate organizations like political
parties, and of the State than most other Western democracies. Thus, with
small-donor contributions exploding via the Internet and public financing
more on the agenda today than it has been since perhaps the post-Watergate
era, it is perhaps not surprising that the forms of public financing about which
reformers in the states, part of Congress, and advocacy groups are most
enthused about are ones grounded in the decisions of individual citizens,
whether through programs that match small-donor contributions or through
voucher programs. It is hard to imagine European democracies even
conceiving, let alone adopting, these forms of public financing (or indirect
public financing).
Small-donor-based public financing fits the individualistic culture of
American democracy better than more traditional forms of direct public
financing. But from a structural and systemic perspective, there are reasons
to be concerned that systems of financing grounded on individual donors—
whether private or semi-public—will contribute to the polarization of
American politics.
That polarization, in turn, contributes to the
dysfunctionality of American government. While we extoll the virtues of
participation, equality, and anti-corruption, we need to be wary about
whether we are creating political “reforms” that contribute to some of the
most disturbing tendencies of current American democracy.

